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ABSTRACT
WENJUAN XU. Systematic policy analysis and management.
(Under the direction of DR. GAIL-JOON AHN AND DR. MOHAMED SHEHAB)
Determining whether a given policy meets a site’s high-level security goals has been
a challenging task, due to the low-level nature and complexity of the policy language,
various security requirements and the multiple policy violation patterns. In this dissertation,
we outline a systematic policy analysis and management approach that enables system
administrators to easily identify and resolve various policy violations. Our approach
incorporates a domain-based isolation model to address the security requirements and
visualization mechanisms to provide the policy administrator with intuitive cognitive sense
about the policy analysis and policy violations. Based on the domain-based isolation model
and the policy visualization mechanisms, we develop a visualization-based policy analysis
and management framework. We also describe our implementation of a visualization-based
policy analysis and management tool that provides the functionalities discussed in our
framework. In addition, a user study is performed and the result is included as part of
our evaluation efforts for the prototype system.
One important application of our policy analysis and management is to support
remote attestation. Remote attestation is an important mechanism to provide the
trustworthiness proof of a computing system by verifying its integrity. In our work, we
propose a remote attestation framework, called Dynamic Remote Attestation Framework
and Tactics (DR@FT), for efficiently attesting a target system based on our extended
visualization-based policy analysis and management approach. In addition, we adopt the
proposed visualization-based policy violation expression to represent integrity violations
with a ranked violation graph, which supports intuitive reasoning of attestation results. We
also describe our experiments and performance evaluation.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Determining whether a system can be trusted or not is a critical problem in system
and network management. Particularly for security reason, a local or remote system
administrator typically needs to verify if a system meets information security objectives,
such as integrity, confidentiality, and availability requirements. For example, to deploy
applications in distributed and collaborative computing environments, one machine may
want to know if another machine is running a known-good version of an application
software on a well-configured, trusted operating system. Without this guarantee, a remote
machine may be running buggy or malicious application code, or may be improperly
configured such that the trusted application can be corrupted by untrustful programs or
users. For these purposes, formal and general security analysis is needed to trust a running
system based on its current security configurations, particularly, its security policies, which
outline the rules, laws and practices for the network access [5]. This dissertation addresses
the issues of security policy analysis and management.
1.1 Security Policy Analysis and Management Challenging
Information flow control is the foundation of many security requirements such as
integrity and confidentiality. The earliest information flow analysis work adopts a lattice
model to illustrate flow relationship between objects [26]. Those works assume that every
object is labeled with a security attribute, and checks information flow by examining the
security labels of the objects in a flow path. Especially, the lattice model requires that
information cannot flow from low integrity objects to high integrity objects. In practical
systems, under various circumstances, information flow is allowed from low integrity
subjects to high integrity subjects. Clark-Wilson model [25] attempts to capture this notion.
2
It states that through certain programs so-called transaction procedures (TP), information
can flow from low integrity objects to high integrity objects. Jaeger et al. [36] adopt this
notion and propose a CW-Lite model, where filters are deployed in all application interfaces
handling information flow from low integrity data to high integrity applications.
There are several related approaches and tools to analyze policies based on certain
information flow control [10, 36]. Most of these work focus on the identification of a
common and minimum system trusted computing base (TCB) [13, 12] which includes
trusted processes for an entire system. These approaches can analyze whether a policy
meets security requirements such as no information flow from low integrity processes
(e.g., unprivileged user processes) to system TCB (e.g., kernel and init). However, they
cannot identify integrity violations for high level services and applications that do not
belong to system TCB. In practical, other than system TCB protection, a high level
application or system service is required to achieve integrity assurance through controlling
any information flow from other applications. TCB community [65] clearly states such a
critical situation as follows: “a network server process under a UNIX-like operating system
might fall victim to a security breach and compromise an important part of the system’s
security, yet is not part of the operating system’s TCB.” Therefore, a more comprehensive
policy analysis for TCB identification and policy violations is desired.
Another issue in policy analysis is the large size and high complexity of typical policies
in contemporary systems. For example, an SELinux [42] policy has over 30,000 policy
statements in a desktop environment. Under these situations, several challenges exist for
system designers or administrators in the context of policy analysis. We enumerate such
challenges: (1) Understanding and querying a policy: All previous policy query tools lack
an effective mechanism for a user to understand a particular policy. Furthermore, without
understanding a policy, the user even cannot figure out what to query; (2) Recognizing
information flow paths: In the work of information flow based policy analysis [31, 55],
information flow paths are expressed with text-based expressions. However, primitive
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text-based explanations cannot provide appropriate degree of clarity and visibility for
describing flow paths; and (3) Identifying integrity violation patterns, inducements, and
aftermaths: In the work of Jaeger et al. [36, 56], they elaborate violation patterns using
graphs. However, their approach does not leverage the features and properties of graphs for
analyzing policies and identifying the causes and effects of integrity violations.
In summary, we need to address several challenging questions for managing security
policy:
• How to express the security requirements comprehensively and accordingly?
• How to analyze the security policy and present the analysis result understandably?
• How to build a usable security policy analysis and management framework and how
to evaluate its usability?
These are the critical questions to be answered to systematically analyze and manage
the security policy. Even though some approaches have been proposed from various aspects
to address the policy analysis and management issues, our study clearly indicates that there
is a need to design a systematic policy analysis and management approach which is general
and flexible enough to reflect and cope with the various access control requirements as well
as solving the issues such as policy complexity. In this research, we would attempt to make
one step towards this direction.
1.2 Statement of the Hypothesis
Therefore, this research hypothesizes that:
A systematic policy analysis and management approach is critical for achieving system
assurance.
We first analyze and articulate the policy analysis requirements for a system in an open
environment. These requirements are then reflected and addressed in our proposed policy
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analysis and management approach in terms of a domain-based isolation model that is
validated through a simulation tool, supportive method for visualizing and analyzing the
security policies against this model, and essential system components and architecture
with detailed policy visualization and enforcement mechanisms. In order to evaluate the
feasibility and usability of our approach, a proof-of-concept system is implemented for
supporting systematic policy analysis and management. Also, we analyze the usability
of this method and tool through the usability study. Furthermore, we extend the policy
analysis approach to realize efficient and effective remote attestation in a dynamic
environment.
1.3 Summary of Contributions and Dissertation Organization
The contributions of our policy analysis and management are summarized as follows:
• We articulate the access control requirements with a proposed domain-based
isolation model and prove it with a simulation tool CPN.
• We propose a visualization-based policy analysis method with graphical query-based
mechanisms to support the security policy analysis.
• Based on the proposed security model and visualization method, we develop a
visualization based policy analysis framework.
• We evaluate our proposed framework through performing the usability study on our
proof-of-concept prototype.
• The visualization-based policy analysis and management work is extended to support
the remote attestation in a dynamic environment.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the issues
in managing complex security policy and discusses existing policy analysis approaches and
information visualization methods. In Chapter 3, we analyze the security requirements of
the security policy and define an information flow model to reflect these requirements.
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Chapter 4 elaborates our method of policy visualization. Chapter 5 proposes the
visualization-based policy analysis and management framework, introduces our prototype
implementation based on the proposed framework and further proves the usability of our
framework by performing a user study. An extension of policy analysis approach to remote
attestation is explained in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes this dissertation and
presents some directions for future work.
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 SELinux Overview
In this section, we briefly overview the SELinux policy [59], which is a typical example
of complex security policy.
2.1.1 SELinux Policy Introduction
Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) [59] enforces mandatory access control
(MAC)-based policies to enhance the security of Linux systems, where the MAC
mechanism is implemented through the Type-Enforcement (TE) policy model [21, 42].
In TE, domain types are used to label processes, while object types are used to label files
and other resources. In SELinux, there is no essential difference between domain types
and object types, and both are called types in general. SELinux associates a security
context with each subject or object (process, files, etc.). A security context is a tuple
that identifies a user, a role, and a type. A set of policy rules specify how subjects can
access objects based on relationships between their security contexts. For example, the
national security agency (NSA) SELinux example policy [3] defines a type security_t
and assigns to all files in directory /security. The policy also defines domain types
user_t and passwd_t, which are respectively associated with processes with a specified
set of executables for unprivileged users and processes for password management. There
is a policy rule allowing user_t to call (transit) the passwd_t and another rule allowing
passwd_t processes to directly operate on resources with type security_t. Hence, a
user_t subject can operate on a security_t object. An operation in SELinux is identified
by two pieces of information: a class (e.g., file, directory, process, and socket) and a
permission (e.g., read, unlink, signal, and sendto). Currently SELinux defines 28 classes
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and approximately 120 permissions.
user joe roles { user_r };
role user_r types { user_t, passwd_t };
allow user_t bin_t { file dir } {read getattr search } ;
allow user_t passwd_exec_t : file {getattr execute}
type passwd_t, domain, privlog, auth_write, privowner;
Joe running as user_t needs to change his password. How does Joe 
change his password?  User_t executes the passwd_t entry file 
passwd_exec_t and then can transit to domain passwd_t. 
allow passwd_t security_t: file { getattr read write };
User declaration specifies user joe is 
authorized with role user_r
Role declaration specifies role user_r is 
authorized to run as untrusted user (user_t).
type user_t, domain, userdomain, unpriv_userdomain, nscd_client_domain, privfd;
Domain declarations separately specify 
user_t domain and passwd_t domain. 
type passwd_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
type bin_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
Types declarations separately specify types 
passwd_exec_t, bin_t and security_t. 
type security_t, fs_type;
These are domain-types allow rules. For example, domain 
passwd_t is allowed  on type security_t with operation {getattr, 
read, write} of class file. 
allow  passwd_t passwd_exec_t : file entrypoint
allow user_t passwd_t : process transition
system_u:object_r:security_t
system_u:object_r:bin_t
system_u:object_r:passwd_exec_t Security context declarations separately specify the security context corresponding to 
the type. It is used to correspond the type  to the file system of the Linux system. For 
example: bin/* :   system_u: object_r:bin_t. This says that bin_t is used to label the file 
under directoy bin.
user_u:user_r:user_t Security context declarations specifies the security context 
corresponding to the domain type user_t. 
Figure 2.1: SELinux policy example.
Other than TE model, SELinux also uses role-based access control (RBAC) model [60]
to help organize policy rules. A user is assigned with a role which is an abstraction designed
to make policy rules more concise. For example, if many users require the same set of
permissions, a role can be defined, a policy rule can be introduced to state that those users
can enter this role, and another rule is specified to associate permissions with the role.
The set of permissions associated with a role is expressed with types. For all object types,
SELinux uses a role object_r and a user system_u to specify their security contexts. A
domain type can be associated with different roles and users for different security contexts.
Figure 2.1 shows some policy structures with SELinux policies. A user Joe can only login
as role user_r, which is associated with types user_t and passwd_t. As passwd_t has
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permissions of security_t: file {getattr read write}, Joe can read and modify the
password file in the system, which is labeled with security_t. Related policy rules for
type and security context declarations are also included in Figure 2.1.
2.1.2 SELinux Policy Characteristics
SELinux types are classified into different categorizations corresponding to the
functions performed by processes and the operations performed on the different
objects [59]. We first present the policy classification which is used in the subsequent
sections. The domain and type classifications are defined as follows:
• Domain Classification: According to SELinux policy configurations from
NSA [59], domain types in SELinux can be classified into system domains, user
program domains, and user login domains. System domains are composed of
domains labeled as system processes (e.g., kernel_t, initrc_t, and init_t)
or daemons (e.g., sendmail_t and ftpd_t). User program domains include
unprivileged user program domains (e.g., user_xserver_t), administrator program
domains (e.g., sysadm
_xserver_t), and some other program domains (e.g., logrotate_t and passwd_t).
User login domains are the domains used for user authorization such as user_t,
sysadm_t, and staff_t. Due to the large number of vulnerabilities that have been
found in daemons (e.g.,sendmail_t) we divide system domains into daemons and
general system domains.
• Type Classification: Types in SELinux can be classified into security types (e.g.,
security_t), device types (e.g., fixed_disk_device_t and device_t), file types
(e.g., etc_t), procfs types (e.g., sysctl_kernel_t and proc_t), devpts types (e.g.,
ptmx_t), nfs types (e.g., nfs_t), and network types (e.g., icmp_socket_t and
port_t).
The details of domain and type classifications are listed in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: SELinux characteristics
SELinux Domains Classification
Domain
Classifications
Subjects Examples
System Domains (SD) domains defined for system
services
kernel_t, initrc_t
Daemons (DAE) domains for system daemons klog_t, sendmail_t
Program Domains
(PRO)
domains for user programs user_xserver_t,
passwd_t,
sysadm_xserver_t
User Login Domains
(ULO)
domains for authorization of
different users
user_t, staff_t,
sysadm_t
SELinux Types Classification
Types Objects Examples
security types (ST) policy configuration related files. security_t
device types (DT) files under /device fixed_disk_device_t
file types (FT) files under directory /root, /etc,
etc.
etc_t, root_t
procfs types (PT) pseudo files under /proc. proc_t
devpts types (DE) pseudo files under /dev/pts ptmx_t
NFS types (NF) files from an NFS server nfs_t
Network types (NE) files for network objects port_t
2.1.3 SELinux Policy Types
SELinux policy can be also classified into targeted policy and strict policy [44], where
the targeted policy is derived from the strict policy with the similar structure. However,
the strict policy attempts to specify policy rules for most programs, while the targeted
policy focuses on network and system services. The primary difference between strict and
targeted policies is the use of the unconfined domain types (unconfined_t) and removal
of any other user domain type (for example, sysadm_t, user_t).
From the organization of the security policy, SELinux policy can be further classified
into original policy and reference policy [44], where the traditional policy is a combination
of sets of rules specifying the security policy. On the other hand, reference policy is targeted
to re-engineer the existing policies by organizing most program policies into .te file, .if file
or .fc file, which brings the flexibility for policy design.
2.1.4 SELinux Policy Security Goals
Six critical security goals are outlined in SELinux policies [16]: (G1) limiting raw
access to data, (G2) protecting kernel integrity, (G3) protecting system file integrity,
(G4) confining privileged processes, (G5) separating processes, and (G6) protecting the
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administrator domain. Among these goals, G2, G3 and G6 are mainly about integrity
protection such as boot files, proc files and security policy related objects. As a more
complex goal, G1 is to protect both the integrity and confidentiality of system resources.
For example, a write operation to fixed disk devices is restricted to fsck for checking
file system consistency. G4 and G5 deal with least privilege properties through restricting
accesses to certain domain types. For instance, a mail server program can only access
certain resources such as mail spool file, and a user program is prohibited from interfering
with administrator programs.
2.2 Information Flow Related Model
Biba integrity model [20, 26] is a widely cited information flow based integrity model.
In Biba model, integrity is preserved for a subject if all high integrity objects meets integrity
requirements and all information flows from subjects with equal or higher integrity. Hence,
Biba property is fulfilled if a high integrity process cannot read lower integrity data, execute
lower integrity programs, nor obtain lower integrity data in any other manner.
Similar to Biba, Low-Water Mark Integrity (LOMAC) [62] allows information flow
from high integrity to low integrity without restrictions. However, information is
unescapable from low integrity to high integrity in certain cases. For example, in a UNIX
system, when a root user logs in, the root user may command the subject executing emacs()
to observe low-integrity objects. In this case, the proper privilege set for the eamcs subject
is to prohibit modification of high-integrity objects. On the other hand, the root user may
command the emacs subject to observe and modify only high-integrity objects. In this
case, the privilege set which prohibits modification of high-integrity objects would be
inappropriate. For solving such ambiguous, LOMAC supports high-integrity process to
read low integrity data, while downgrading the process’s integrity level to the lowest level
that it has ever read. For example, when the root user observes low-integrity objects, this
process needs to be downgraded.
Different from Biba model, Clark-Wilson [25, 54] model provides a different view of
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dependencies, which states that through certain programs so-called transaction procedures
(TP), information can flow from low integrity objects to high integrity objects. Based on
Clark-Wilson model, the concept of TP is evolved into filters in CW-Lite [56] model. A
filter can be a Firewall, an authentication process, or a program interface for downgrading
or upgrading the privileges of a process. In CW-Lite model, information can flow from low
integrity processes to high integrity processes through filters.
Usable Mandatory Integrity Protection (UMIP) [41] is an integrity model which states
that low integrity processes are not allowed to flow to high integrity processes with several
exceptions. For example, information flow from low integrity process (i.e., network)
to high integrity process (administration) through remote administration such as sshd is
allowed in the model. Furthermore, low integrity process (unprivileged user) can flow to
high integrity process (administration) through a process such as su.
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) protection is proposed [27], where TCB is the total
combination of protection mechanisms within a computer system, which includes the
hardware, software and firmware that are trusted to enforce a security policy. They propose
to separate TCB from the remainder of the system and a trust path must also exist so that a
user can access TCB without being compromised by other processes or users.
Domain isolation [24] is another way to specify the security requirements in the
system. The main purpose of domain isolation is to state the web security requirements,
for considering appropriate enforcement of the same-origin principle. This same-origin
principle can be interpreted as “a script originated from one Internet domain should not be
able to read, manipulate or infer the contents originated from another domain.” Failures
to enforce this principle may result in severe security consequences such as information
leakage or identity theft.
2.3 Information Flow-based Policy Analysis Tool
The closest existing work to ours include Jaeger et al. [36] and Shankar et al. [56]. In
these work, they use a tool called Gokyo for checking the integrity of a proposed TCB for
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SELinux [59]. Also, they propose to implement their idea in an automatic way. Gokyo
mainly identifies a common TCB in SELinux but a typical system may have multiple
applications and services with various trust relationships. However, achieving the integrity
assurance for these applications and services has not been addressed in Gokyo.
SETools [9] are a set of tools developed by Tresys Technology to provide support for
SELinux policy. Among them, seaudit is used to analyze audit messages from SELinux;
seaudit-report generates highly-customized audit log reports; sechecker-command line tool
performs modular checks on an SELinux policy; sediff identifies the policy difference
in SELinux policy; and secmds is a command-line tool to analyze and search SELinux
policy. APOL is a graphical user interface based tool to analyze a SELinux policy
file [6]. A lot of functions are supported in APOL such as browsing and searching policy
components (e.g., types, attributes, object classes, roles, users, and booleans), searching
through type enforcement and other rules, and viewing file contexts from a filesystem. In
addition, APOL allows policy administrator to perform domain transition, file relabel, types
relationship, and information flow analysis.
SLAT (Security Enhanced Linux Analysis Tool) [31] defines an information flow model
and policies are analyzed based on this model. Especially, SLAT has a policy query
mechanism which are written in a special-purpose language. A SLAT query is, roughly
speaking, a kind of regular expression that specifies the expected form of information flow
paths between two specific security contexts. SLAT determines whether all information
flow paths between those endpoints meet the expected form. If the answer is “no”, SLAT
provides a counterexample. SLAT queries can be converted into a finite automata that can
easily be expressed as logic programs. However, SLAT does not support policy editing and
only provides text-based interface which is hard for the policy administrator to understand.
PAL (Policy Analysis using Logic Programming) [55] uses SLAT information flow
model to implement a framework for analyzing SELinux policies. The main difference
between PAL and SLAT is their query language. PAL is realized with logic programs, and
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is more flexible than SLAT. For example, PAL can answer queries whose results are sets of
security contexts, relations between security contexts, etc. Also, PAL can answer high-level
queries such as “find all security contexts from which information can flow to security
context c without passing through security context d.” Although PAL is more flexible than
SLAT with respect to the policy query, it also has the problem such as complexity in editing
policy and lack of user-friendliness.
SELinux Policy Editor (Seedit) [7] is a tool originally developed by Hitachi Software.
The main purpose of Seedit is to over-come the above mentioned problems. In Seedit, it
provides a simplified policy specification called Simplified Policy Description Language
(SPDL) for the policy administrator to manage the security policy. Also, it has a graphical
interface to generate simplified policies so administrators do not have to remember the
syntax of SPDL. However, Seedit also has two challenges to solve: (1) Integrating
object classes and access vector does not allow to support a fine-grained configuration
specification. (2) Seedit compiler compiles the simplified policy into SElinux policy
configuration file. However, the compiler needs to be updated whenever new version of
SELinux is released.
In summary, all the existing tools attempt to provide a query-based policy analysis for
policy developers or security administrators. However, they all display policies and policy
query results in text-based expressions, which are difficult to understand and accommodate
the analysis results.
2.4 Visualization Technology Application in Security
Information visualization [34] enables users to explore, analyze, reason and explain
abstract information by taking advantage of its visual cognitive effects. Several disciplines
have adopted information visualization mechanisms to better understand and reason about
the collected data.
There are several work to leverage information visualization for network security.
Lakkaraju et al. [69] presents a visualization design to enhance the ability of an
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administrator to detect and investigate anomalous traffic between a local network and
external domains. NCSA [70] shows the network data information such as IP addresses
is visualized to present better view for system administrators. Event Correlation for
Cyber-Attack Recognition System [43] performs aggregation and correlation of the security
events based on their semantic content to visualize attack tracks in a real-time manner.
Several intrusion detection work also focus on visualization of intrusions. In addition,
Robert et al. [28] proposes a methodology for analyzing network and computer log
information with visual analytics of user behaviors. Thompson et al. [63] attempts to
determine whether a graphical interface or a standard textual interface is more affective
for intrusion detection.
Also, an interactive visualization framework [68] is designed for the automated trust
negotiation protocol. This framework provides capabilities to perform the interactive
visualization of a trust negotiation session, display credentials and policies, analyze the
relations of negotiated components, and refine access control policies and negotiation
strategies.
Some efforts in firewall policy visualization are also performed [40, 46, 64].
VisualFirewall [40] seeks to aid in the configuration of firewalls and monitoring of networks
by providing four simultaneous views that display packet details and corresponding firewall
reactions. Fireviz [46] incorporates a peripheral mapping of the network on a user’s screen
and displays network events along this periphery. Policyvis [64] visualizes firewall policies
to enable a user to place general inquiry such as “does my policy do what I intend to do
unrestrictedly? ”
2.5 Visualization Representable Technology
The typical visualization technology in this dissertation can be classified into two main
streams such as node-link and adjacency matrix methods.
There are a lot of different node-link based visualization method. Semantic
Substrates [18] is a visualization method based on node-link targeting to visualize the social
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network based on semantic substrates. The basic idea is that the graph layouts are based on
user-defined semantic substrates, that are non-overlapping regions in which node placement
is based on node attributes. Also, users interactively control link visibility to limit clutter
and thus ensure comprehensibility of source and destination. Semantic substrates are
effective only if there are some categorical attributes or if a numerical attribute can be
combined to form categories. A small number of categories is convenient for effectively
visualizing the results. Although there are limitations in the implementation, the utility of
semantic substrates cope with a large number of nodes and links. Also, with the node-link
based diagram, semantic substrates method is very useful to support a small number of
graphs. However, in many situations, the graph maybe very large and dense.
Adjacency matrix [39] is a square matrix-based information visualization method. In
the adjacency matrix, a non-zero entry means that there is a link from the vertex represented
by a column of the matrix to the vertex represented by a row. On the other hand, the
non-zero entries in the adjacency matrix are usually visualized as colored blocks and
zero entries as blank blocks. Adjacency matrix is widely used in graph visualization
because they can effectively display a large and complex graph by interpreting the structural
information in a matrix view to a graph. Although adjacency matrix can be used to visualize
both directed and undirected graphs, it may cause some difficulties in finding the path from
one node to another node in the directed graph.
CHAPTER 3: DOMAIN-BASED ISOLATION MODEL
To comprehensively and effectively analyze the security requirements focusing on
access control, in this chapter, we first introduce a domain-based isolation model. Then,
we validate through a case study with SELinux security policy for identifying the policy
violations.
3.1 Domain-based Isolation Model Definition and Specification
3.1.1 Security Policies
A security policy is composed of a set of subjects, a set of objects, and a set of policy
statements or rules which states that a subject can perform what kind of actions on an
object. For information flow purpose, all operations between subjects and objects can be
classified as write_like or read_like [31] and operations between subjects can be expressed
as calls.
x y
write_like
Figure 3.1: Write
x y
read_like
Figure 3.2: Read
x
call
y
Figure 3.3: Call
Depending on the types of operations, information flow relationships can be identified.
If subject x can write to object y, then there is information flow from x to y (shown in
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Figure 3.1), which is denoted as write(x,y). On the other hand, if subject x can read object
y, then there is information flow from y to x denoted as read(y,x) (shown in Figure 3.2).
Another situation is that if subject x can call another subject y, then there is information
flow from y to x, which is denoted as call(y,x) (shown in Figure 3.3).
Moreover, the information flow relationships between subjects and objects can be
further described through flow transitions. In a policy, if a subject s1 can write to an object
o which can be read by another subject s2, then it implies that there is an information
flow transition from a subject s1 to a subject s2, denoted as f lowtrans(s1,s2). Also, if a
subject s2 can call a subject s1, there is a flow transition from s1 to s2. A sequence of flow
transitions between two subjects represents an information flow path.
3.1.2 Domain-based Isolation Model (DIM)
Retrospecting the integrity models introduced in related work, one-way information
flow with Biba would not be sufficient for many cases as communication and collaboration
between application or service domains are frequently required in most systems. Although
filters between high and low integrity data are sufficient enough for TCB and NON-TCB
isolations, it is not suitable for application or service domain isolations. For example,
processes of user applications and staff applications are required to be isolated since both
are beyond the minimum and common TCB boundaries. With that reason, we develop a
domain-based isolation model, in which a concept called domain TCB is defined to describe
subjects and objects required to be isolated for an information domain. To be clear, the
minimum and common TCB of a system is called system TCB in our work. Also, for a
subject in a system, if it neither belongs to the system TCB, nor belongs to the domain
TCB of a particular application or service, then it is in the NON-TCB of the system.
System TCB System TCB is a concept same as the concept of TCB [12]. To identify
system TCB, reference monitor-based approach is proposed in [17], where system TCB is
identified through the identification of subjects functioning as reference monitor. Applying
this idea to SELinux, subjects functioning as reference monitor such as checkpolicy
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and loading policy belong to system TCB. Also, subjects used to support reference
monitor such as kernel and initial, should be included into system TCB. After reference
monitor-based identification of initial system TCB is completed, other subjects such as lvm,
restorecon should also be added into system TCB based on their relationships with initial
system TCB. Other optional methods for identifying system TCB are proposed in [36].
Information Domain As mentioned above, an application or service information domain
consists of a set of subjects and objects. Here, we propose two steps to identify an
information domain.
• Step1: Keyword-based domain identification Generally, subjects and objects in a
security policy are described based on their functions, e.g., http is always the prefix
for describing web server subjects and objects in SELinux. Hence, to identify the
web server domain, we use keyword http to identify the initial set of subjects and
objects.
• Step2: Flow-based domain identification In a security policy, some subjects or
objects cannot be identified through keyword prefix. However, they can flow to
initially identified domain subjects and objects, influencing the integrity of this
domain. Therefore, we also need to include these subjects and objects into the
domain. For instance, in a Linux system, var files can be read by web server subjects
such as httpd. Hence they should be included in the web server domain.
Domain TCB To protect the integrity of an information domain, a domain TCB is
defined. TCB(d) (domain d’s TCB) is composed of a set of subjects and objects in domain
d which has the same level of security sensitivity. In other words, a web server domain
running in a system consists of many subjects–such as processes, plugins, and tools, and
other objects including data files, configuration files, and logs. We consider all of these
subjects and objects as TCB of this domain, while its network object such as tcp : 80
(http_port_t) is not considered as TCB since it may accept low integrity data from low
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integrity subjects. In a system, the integrity of an object is determined by the integrity of
subjects that have operations on this object. Hence, we need to identify TCB(d) subjects of
each information domain and verify the assurance of their integrity.
To ease this task, a minimum TCB(d) is preferred. However, in the situation that
the minimum TCB(d) subjects have dependency relationships with other subjects, these
subjects should be added to domain TCB or dependencies should be removed. Based on
these principles, we first identify initial TCB(d) subjects which are predominant subjects
for domain d. We further discover TCB(d) considering subject dependency relationships
with the initial TCB(d) through flow transition-based identification and violation-based
adjustment.
• Step1: Initial TCB(d) identification In an information domain, there always exist
one or several predominant subjects, which launch all or most of other subjects
functioning in the same domain. Here, we identify the initial TCB(d) subjects based
on such subject launching relationships and the number of subjects that those subjects
can cascadingly launch. For example, for web server domain, httpd launches all other
processes such as httpd_script, hence it belongs to the initial TCB(d) of this domain.
• Step2: Flow transition-based TCB(d) identification The subjects that can flow only
to and from the initial TCB(d) are included into domain TCB. For instance, if subject
httpd_php can flow only to and from httpd, then httpd_php should be included into
TCB(d).
• Step3: TCB(d) adjustment by resolving policy violations After identifying
policy violations, we adjust the identified TCB(d) to exclude or include subjects
accordingly. For example, a subject awstats_script (web server statistics script) is
initially excluded from TCB(d). After identifying policy violations caused to web
server TCB(d) by awstats_script, we can figure out that these violations can be
ignored. Hence, the TCB(d) should be adjusted to include awstats_script.
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DIM Definition To protect the identified TCBs and TCBd , we develop domain-based
isolation model, whose principles are similar to those in Clark-Wilson [54]. Clark-Wilson
leverages transaction procedures (TP) to allow information flow from low integrity to high
integrity processes. We also adopt the concept of filter. With the identifications of TCBs,
TCBd and filters, for information domain d, all other subjects in a system are categorized
as NON-TCB.
Based on the concept of system TCB and TCB(d), a domain-based isolation model is
defined as follows.
Definition 1 : Domain-based isolation model is satisfied for an information domain d if
for any information flow to TCB(d), the information flow path is within TCB(d); or the
information flow path is from the system TCB to TCB(d); or the information flow path is
from another domain TCB and it is filtered.
Through this definition, domain-based isolation model achieves the integrity of an
information domain by isolating information flow to TCB(d). This model requires that
any information flow happening in a domain d adheres within the TCB(d), from system
TCB to the TCB(d), or from another domain TCB via filter(s). In this work we do
not discuss the integrity of filters, which can be ensured with other mechanisms such as
formal verification or integrity measurement and attestation [52]. Filters can be processes
or interfaces that normally is a distinct input information channel and is created by a
particular open(), accept() or other call that enables data input. For example, Linux su
process allows a low integrity process (e.g., staff) to be high integrity process (e.g., root)
through calling passwd process thus passwd can be regarded as a filter for processes run
by root privilege. For another example, high integrity process (e.g., httpd administration)
can accept low integrity information (e.g, network data) through the secure channel such
as sshd. Consequently, sshd can be treated as another example of filter for higher privilege
processes. Normally, it is the developer’s tasks to build filtering interfaces and prove
effectiveness to the community [49]. Generally, without viewing system application codes,
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an easier way for policy administrator to identify filters is to declare filters with clear
annotations during policy development [56]. Here, we assume that filters can be identified
through annotations. Also, in our work, initially we do not have a set of predefined filters.
After detecting a possible policy violation, we identify or introduce a subject as a filter to
resolve policy violations.
Policy Violation Detection Based on the domain-based isolation model, we treat a
TCB(d) as an isolated information domain. We propose the following rules for articulating
possible policy violations for system TCB and TCB(d) protections.
Rule 1 : If there is information flow to a system TCB from its subjects without passing any
filter, there is a policy violation for protecting the system TCB.
Rule 2 : If there is information flow from TCB(dx) to TCB(dy) without passing any filter,
there is a policy violation in protecting TCB(dy).
3.1.3 Policy Violation Resolution
After possible policy violations are identified with violation detection rules, we take
systematic strategies to resolve them. Basically, for a violation, we first evaluate if it can
be resolved by adding or removing related subjects to/from system or domain TCBs. This
causes no change to the policy. Secondly, we try to identify if there is a filter along with
the information flow path that causes the violation. If a filter can be identified, then the
violation is a false alarm and there is no change to the policy graph. Thirdly, we attempt to
modify policy, either by excluding subjects or objects from the violated information flow
path, or by replacing subjects or objects with more restricted privileges. In addition, we
can also introduce a filter subject that acts as a gateway between unauthorized subjects and
protected subjects.
3.2 Analyze Security Policies with CPN Against DIM
Colored Petri Nets (CPN) is a powerful graph-based analysis tool for system
modeling [37]. A Petri Nets includes three basic components: places, transitions, and
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arcs. Arc expressions specify a collection of tokens, which are added to or removed from
places. If a transition input contains at least one token that is equal to the corresponding
arc expression, the transition is enabled. The difference between CPN and Petri Nets is the
inclusion of color sets in CPN, which can be viewed as abstract data types in a programming
language. These types determine data attributes and operations used in arcs, guards, and
initialization expression functions. CPN can support graph hierarchy, zoom in, zoom out,
color expression, and so on. Also, CPN has a simulator to support execution of specified
models. The simulation is to validate whether the system works correctly reflecting the
design principles. It supports both interactive and automatic simulations. In the interactive
simulation, a user can set breakpoints, choose between enabled binding elements, change
markings of places, and study the tokens in detail. However, in the automatic simulation,
the simulator makes random choices of the enabled binding elements and automatically
executes the whole CPN models.
3.2.1 Policy Simulation with CPN
3.2.1.1 Policy in XML
Based on the definition of policy graph, we design a scheme to express policies in
eXtensible Markup Language (XML) so that our policy can be specified in a standard
form. As shown in Figure 3.4, the XML file generated from a parsed SELinux policy has
two elements: DT and DD. The DT element includes three sets of subelements: (1) non
replicated operation relationships between types, (2) the types that can flow to and from
other types, and (3) the starting domain types which can not be flown into by any other
types. Also, it may contain the types that can only be flown into. The DD element specifies
information about non-replicated transition relationships between types.
In our experiments, we parse a real world binary policy file, policy.19 into a defined
policy structure based on the source package of APOL [10] with our parsing engine.
Then, we retrieve the information about domain types, types and related rules. Using
LibXML2 [47], we transform these information into a XML file in the defined template.
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domain--domain transition 
relationship
types involved in the domain-type related path
domains that are the starting points of the domain-type related paths
domains involved in the domain-type related paths
domain—type relationships
 <?xml version="1.0"? encoding="UTF-8"?>
-<policy>                                                 
-<section type="DT">
    <dtoperation start="user_t" direction="write_like" end="devtty_t" />
<dtoperation start="user_mozilla_t" direction="write_like" end="devtty_t" />
<dtoperation start="user_games_t" direction="write_like" end="devtty_t" />
<dtoperation start="sendmail_t" direction="write_like" end="devtty_t" />
<dtoperation start="sysadm_t" direction="write_like" end="devtty_t" />
<dtoperation start="mount_t" direction="write_like" end="devtty_t" />
<dtoperation start="fsadm_t" direction="write_like" end="devtty_t" />
<dtoperation start="mount_t" direction="read_like" end="devtty_t" />
.......
<dlist d="user_t" />
<dlist d="user_mozilla_t" />
.......
<dslist d="kernel_t" />
.......
<tlist d="devtty_t" />
.......
  </section>
-<section type ="DD">
<domaintrans start="sysadm_t" transdomain="mount_t"/>
<domaintrans start="initrc_t" transdomain="mount_t"/>
<domaintrans start="staff_su_t" transdomain="sysadm_t"/>
<domaintrans start="newrole_t" transdomain="sysadm_t"/>
........
</section>
 </policy>
Figure 3.4: Example SELinux policy rules in XML
3.2.1.2 Extended CPN to Express Policy
name allow
Tlist
1'[“name”]
TlistTlist
tl^^[“name”]
tl
tl
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(b)  DrawFO(name)
name
allowname
(a)  DrawSP(name)
(c)  DrawFI(name) (d)  DrawOP(name)
Figure 3.5: Graph drawing
To automatically visualize a policy, we use eXtensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) [33]
to transform the policy in XML to CPN graph. The following basic functions are designed
for the CPN graph generation with standard ML [8] as shown in Figure 3.5.
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• DrawSP(name) is to draw the types that no information can flow into. This function
draws a place that contains the initial marking whose value is the name of the place,
and the arc that has a variable to express information contained in the place and the
transition called allow. We define dlist as a color set of the place, which is a form of
a string list containing one or more type names.
• DrawFO(name) is to draw the places for types from which information can flow out.
It is similar to DrawSP(name), but the places generated with this function do not
have the initial marking.
• DrawFI(name) defines the function for drawing places containing the types that no
information can flow out from them.
• DrawOP(name) is to draw an arc that connects types. The expression on the arc is
to generate a list expressing flow transitions caused by domain type transitions or
operations between types.
3.2.1.3 Policy in CPN Graph
Hierarchical graph for 
SELinux policies
Policy 
violations
Figure 3.6: Policy visualization with hierarchy
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With the above extended CPN functions, XML-based SELinux policy rules are parsed
into a CPN graph. In order to perform the process of detecting policy violations in CPN, the
TCB related definitions, filter information and the rules for policy violation identification
are also expressed in XML and transformed into CPN graphs. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 illustrate
policy visualization results.
Input of the 
policies graph
Output of the 
policies graph
Figure 3.7: Policy visualization details
3.2.2 Policy Violation Identification
In this section, we specify how to identify the policy violations from the CPN graph.
Due to the complexity of the policy and potential policy violations, we take Apache as the
example to show how to identify the policy violations related to Apache from the CPN
graph, instead of demonstrating our framework with an entire system.
3.2.2.1 Apache TCB and TCB(d) Identification
Based on our TCB identification strategy mentioned in the previous sections, we carry
out the system TCB identification and the result is shown in Table 3.1. The collection of the
TCB(d) for Apache information domain is performed based on our TCB(d) identification
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method defined in DIM section. Table 3.1 shows the comprehensive list of TCBs that our
tool successfully identified. As stated in DIM part, filters are hard to identify, so we set
initial filter values to null and put this information into the policy XML file. Later, when
possible policy violations are detected, filters are identified and added to the XML file
through CPN.
Table 3.1: Apache information domain
System TCB
kernel_t load_policy_t initrc_t bootloader_t
mount_t ipsec_mgmt_t useradd_t automount_t
hwclock_t admin_passwd_exec_t cardmgr_t checkpolicy_t
kudzu_t sshd_login_t restorecon_t newrole_t
syslogd_t sysadm_t getty_t apt_t
dpkg_t logrotate_t snmpd_t ldconfig_t
lvm_t local_login_t setfiles_t sshd_t
quota_t passwd_t fsadm_t klogd_t
init_t
Identified Key word-based Apache Subjects and Objects
Apache Subjects
httpd_staff_script_t httpd_awstats_script_t httpd_t httpd_rotatelogs_t
httpd_unconfined_script_t httpd_php_t httpd_sysadm_script_t httpd_sys_script_t
httpd_prewikka_script_t httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t httpd_user_script_t httpd_suexec_t
httpd_helper_t
Apache Objects
httpd_staff_script_ra_t httpd_unconfined_script_ro_t httpd_cache_t httpd_user_script_rw_t
httpd_user_script_exec_t httpd_prewikka_script_ro_t httpd_exec_t httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_ra_t
httpd_user_htaccess_t httpd_apcupsd_cgi_htaccess_t httpd_lock_t http_port_t
httpd_sys_script_rw_t httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_rw_t httpd_tmpfs_t httpd_awstats_script_ra_t
httpd_helper_exec_t http_cache_client_packet_t httpd_log_t httpd_awstats_script_ro_t
httpd_awstats_htaccess_t httpd_awstats_script_exec_t httpd_user_content_t http_cache_port_t
httpd_awstats_script_rw_t httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_exec_t httpd_staff_htaccess_t httpd_sysadm_script_rw_t
httpd_sys_script_ra_t httpd_prewikka_script_exec_t httpd_suexec_exec_t httpd_sysadm_script_ro_t
httpd_user_script_ro_t httpd_unconfined_script_ra_t httpd_php_tmp_t httpd_php_exec_t
httpd_prewikka_content_t httpd_prewikka_htaccess_t httpd_staff_content_t httpd_staff_script_ro_t
httpd_rotatelogs_exec_t httpd_prewikka_script_ra_t httpd_squirrelmail_t httpd_unconfined_script_rw_t
http_server_packet_t httpd_prewikka_script_rw_t httpd_sys_htaccess_t httpd_modules_t
httpd_staff_script_rw_t httpd_sysadm_script_exec_t httpd_tmp_t httpd_sys_script_ro_t
httpd_sysadm_htaccess_t httpd_staff_script_exec_t httpd_sys_content_t httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_ro_t
httpd_sys_script_exec_t httpd_unconfined_script_exec_t httpd_config_t httpd_suexec_tmp_t
httpd_sysadm_content_t httpd_unconfined_content_t http_client_packet_t httpd_unconfined_htaccess_t
httpd_sysadm_script_ra_t httpd_apcupsd_cgi_content_t httpd_var_lib_t httpd_user_script_exec_t
httpd_awstats_content_t http_cache_server_packet_t httpd_var_run_t
Identified Flow-based Apache Subjects and Objects
Apache Subjects
applications staff application sysadm application services
user application
Apache Objects
*_node_t (10 types) *_port_t (116 types) *_fs_t (38types) *_home_dir_t (4 types)
others
Identified Apache TCB(d)
httpd_suexec_t httpd_awstats_script_t httpd_t httpd_helper_t
httpd_sysadm_script_t httpd_prewikka_script_t httpd_rotatelogs_t httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t
httpd_php_t
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3.2.2.2 Policy Violation Identification
Simulation is a technique supported by CPN to analyze a system by conducting
controlled experiments [37]. In our experiments, we utilize the simulation feature to
generate policy violations with text expressions. To better understand the violations, we
visualize the generated expressions with another XML transformation. In our simulation,
policy analysis result is stored in a simulation report. Through parsing the simulation
report, we generate the information about policy violation specifications and produce a
new XML file with the similar XSL algorithm. The generated XML file is transformed
into another CPN graph for visualization. Figure 3.8 partially shows the identified policy
violations, specifying that some NON-TCB domain types can write to the type devtty_t,
which can be read by some TCB types.
3.2.2.3 Policy Violation Resolving
Due to the limitation of CPN graph expression, it is not easy to view and understand the
policy and policy violations. In other words, we can only give several example resolutions
of policy violations. Based on the identified policy violations, the integrity of TCB and
TCB(d) is identified since NON-TCB subjects have write_like operations on objects that
can be read by TCB(d) subjects. Retrieving the method of policy violation resolution, we
resolve the policy violations with following methods.
• Modify Policy Rules: Many policy violations are caused because related subjects
or objects have too much privileges. Hence, rather than just removing related
policy statements, we also need to replace these subjects or objects with more
restricted rights. For example, for policy violations caused by read and write
accesses to device_t, our resolution is to redefine device_t by introducing
staff_device_t, user_device_t, and http_device_t. Corresponding policy
rules are also modified as follows:
allow httpd_t device_t:chr_file {ioctl read getattr lock write
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NON-TCB Apache TCB(d)Violation bridge
Figure 3.8: Policy violations
append}; is changed to
allow httpd_t http_device_t:chr_file {ioctl read getattr lock
write append};
• Add Filter: Based on the domain-based integrity model, a filter can be introduced into
policies to remove policy violations. For example, to remove the violations caused
by port_t, we introduce a network filter subject as follows:
allow user_xserver_t networkfilter_t:process transition;
allow networkfilter_t port_t:tcp_socket {recv_msg send_msg};
After the modification is applied, the original policy violations are eliminated. In
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NON-TCB Apache TCB(d)Filtered  bridge
Violation bridge removed
Figure 3.9: Policy violation resolution
general, to validate the result of a policy modification, we recheck the relationships
between the policy violation related domains and types. Comparing Figure 3.9 with
Figure 3.8, we can observe that all read operations between TCB(d) and type port_t
are removed. Also, the write operations between NON-TCB and port_t are also
removed. Instead, a new domain networkfilter_t is added, which has write and
read operations on port_t. Also, all TCB(d) and NON-TCB subjects can transit to
this new domain type.
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3.2.3 Discussion
In this Chapter, we have proposed a domain-based isolation model to describe the
access control requirements. In particular, our general method showed how we can identify
system TCBs and domain TCBs regard to information domains in a system, and present
a set of rules to detect all possible policy violations from NON-TCB to system TCB and
between domain TCBs based on domain-based isolation model. We also automated the
analysis processes using CPN as well as visualized graph-based violation detection. We
used SELinux policy as an example to show the functionality and effectiveness of our
methodology.
However, there are several limitations about using CPN for policy analysis.
• Manual identification of TCB and TCB(d) CPN does not provide an effective way
for identifying the information domain and domain TCB which are proposed in
the domain-based isolation model. Hence, we need to manually identify those
information, which are very hard for the policy administrator to handle.
• Limited graph view of policy and policy violation, and difficulty of policy violation
resolution Due to the huge size of the policy and policy violations, the CPN
graphs get complicated, the lines in the graph are crossed and difficult to view.
Hence, the CPN graph view cannot clearly give the policy administrator the
intuitive understanding about policy and policy violations. Consequently, the policy
administrator is difficult to effectively resolve policy violations.
• Difficult to generate the policy graph: Although we have successfully designed and
implemented the functions for automatically generating the policy CPN graph, due
to the complexity of policy, the generation of policy CPN graph was very exhausted.
• Difficult to identify the policy violations: Due to the limitation of CPN, the generated
policy violations are expressed in a plain text. It has to be transformed into
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CPN graph again based on our designed functions. This brings an unexpected
overhead in terms of policy violation generation and policy transformation costs,
e.g., the generation of policy violation information costs around 6 minutes and the
transformation of policy violation information costs around 1 minutes.
CHAPTER 4: POLICY VISUALIZATION
Information visualization leverages highly-developed human visual systems to achieve
rapid uptake of abstract information. In our framework we use information visualization
techniques to visualize the policy to enable the system administrator to better understand
the configured policy. In this Chapter, we first define the policy graphs, information flow
graphs and policy violation graphs. Based on these definitions, we present our proposed
semantic substrates and adjacency matrix-based policy visualization mechanisms. To
facilitate the policy violation identification, we develop a graph-based query mechanism
based on the policy visualization graphs.
4.1 Policy Related Graph Definition
4.1.1 Policy Graph
As defined in Chapter 3, a security policy consists of a set of subjects, objects, and
operations including write, read and call. Hereby, we define a policy graph as follows:
Definition 2 : A Policy Graph of a system is a directed graph G=(V,E), where the set of
vertices V represents all subjects and objects in the system, and the set of edges E=V × V
represents all information flow relations between subjects and objects. That is,
• V=Vo
⋃
Vs, where Vo and Vs are the sets of nodes that represent objects and subjects,
respectively;
• E=Er
⋃
Ew
⋃
Ec. Given the vertices vs1,vs2 ∈ Vs separately representing subject
s1 and s2, and vertices vo ∈ Vo representing object o, (vs1,vo) ∈ Ew if and only if
write(s1,o), (vo,vs2) ∈ Er if and only if read(o,s2), and (vs1,vs2) ∈ Ec if and only if
call(s1,s2).
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4.1.2 Information Flow Graph
Based the specification of information flow in domain-based isolation model, here we
arrive the definition of flow transitions and flow path as follows.
Definition 3 : In a policy graph G=(V,E), for any s1,s2 ∈V , an information flow transition
f lowtrans(s1,s2) exists if:
• ∃o ∈V,write(s1,o)∧ read(o,s2); or
• call(s1,s2) .
We also say that predicate f lowtrans(s1,s2) is true if f lowtrans(s1,s2) exists.
Definition 4 : In a policy graph G=(V,E), an information flow path f lowpath(s1,sn) exists
(and predicate f lowpath(s1,sn) is true) if:
• there exists f lowtrans(s1,sn); or
• ∃si ∈V , f lowpath(s1,si)∧ f lowpath(si,sn).
4.1.3 Policy Violation Graph
Based on the definition of policy graph and information flow path, we also arrive the
policy violation graph definition as follows.
Definition 5 : Given a policy graph G = (V,E), the subject vertices belonging to
NON-TCB, system TCB, and TCB(d) are represented by VNTCB, VTCB, and VTCBd ,
respectively. A violation policy graph Gv = (V v,Ev) for domain d is a subgraph of G
where
• V v = {v : v ∈VNTCB,∃u : u ∈VTCB∪VTCBd ∧ (v,u) ∈ E}
• Ev = {(u,v) : u,v ∈V v∧ (u,v) ∈ E}
34
4.2 Policy Visualization Mechanisms
To visualize the policy and policy violations based on the above definitions, we mainly
adopt two kinds of mechanisms including semantic substrates-based policy visualization
and adjacency matrix-based policy visualization.
4.2.1 Semantic Substrates-based Policy Visualization
Policy Graph: Links between S2 and  O2 represents 
write operation; between  S3  and  O2 expresses read 
operation; between  S4 and  S3 denotes call operation
S
O
Sc1 Sc2 Sc3
Oc1 Oc2 Ocm
s1
s3
o1
Scn
s4
s5
o2o3
s2
Untrusted subjectTrusted subject object
Figure 4.1: Semantic substrate-based policy visualizationAlgorithm 1: [Building Semantic-based Policy Graph]Input:     The Policy file Policy, the Policy Explanation File Fe ,  the Permission Mapping File Fp , the Subject Classification File Fs, the Object Classification File Fo.Output:  A Semantic-based Policy Graph GMethod:(1) Policy_t: = policyParsing( Policy,Fe, Fp, Fs, Fo);/* parsing the policies files into subjects, objects and relationships , and mapping the classification into the parsed policies.(2)   G = drawCanvas (Policy_t); /* constructing the canvas for drawing the graphs and also dividing the graphs into different areas. (3)   G = drawNodes (G , Policy_t); /* reading the entities for the policies and drawing them in nodes into the classified areas based on the Policy_t structure.(4)   G = drawLines (Policy_t, G , n); /* drawing the link from the node to the other nodes and setting the attribute for the link.
Figure 4.2: Algorithm for building semantic substrate-based policy graph
Several visualization studies concluded that humans perceive data coded in spatial
dimensions far more easily than those coded in non-spatial ones [30, 18]. Based on
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this concept, we use semantic substrates to display policies. We divide a canvas into
different areas based on the classification of entities (subjects and objects) and then
layout nodes expressing the entities into corresponding areas. We also use non-spacial
cues (e.g., color or shape) to emphasize certain nodes or a group of nodes. Figure 4.1
shows the semantic substrates-based graph design. The Y-axis is divided into regions,
where each region contains nodes representing entities such as subjects and objects.
Furthermore, in each region, nodes representing entities of different classifications are
placed in different spaces along with the X-axis. For subjects and objects in a policy,
Sc1...Scn and Oc1...Ocm separately represent certain classifications. Different colors and
shapes are used to distinguish the identification of different nodes. Circles and rectangles
are used to represent subjects and objects, respectively. Relationships between subjects
and objects are expressed with lines in different colors or shapes. For instance, the write
operation between a subject s2 and an object o2 is expressed with a red link.
Different security policies have different formats and components. To give a uniformed
way for policy analysis, we need to preprocess a primitive policy. Figure 4.2 summarizes
the procedures of policy graph representation. First, a policy file Policy is parsed and
mapped through a policy explanation file Fe and a permission mapping file Fp. Fe includes
meta information such as the format of the policy and subject/object attributes in the policy.
The policy format can be binary or text and is organized in a certain order. The subjects
are users or processes and objects are system resources such as files, data, port or labels
specifying these resources. Fp states operations between subjects and objects that are
mapped to write(), read(), or call(). For instance, if a subject has an operation to get
the attribute of an object, the operation is mapped to read(). In addition, Fs and Fo files
separately define subject and object classifications in the system. After parsing the policy,
a canvas is drawn and divided into different areas, on which nodes representing policy
entities are drawn and relationships between them are expressed with arrows. Also, during
the execution of this algorithm, policy rules are stored as attributes for corresponding graph
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nodes and arrows.
In addition, different colors and shapes in the policy violation graphs are used to help
the identification of different nodes, for example, red circles, black circles and red squares
are used to represent trusted domains (TCB and TCB(d)), untrusted domains and protected
types respectively.
4.2.2 Adjacency Matrix-based Visualization
The semantic substrates is a very good choice for path finding for the case that the
links are not heavily crossed or tangled. For visualizing a path in a dense policy graph
we propose to use an adjacency matrix approach [58, 39]. We further enhance the path
visualization capabilities of the adjacency matrix approach by adding new characteristics
of direction. We also develop a direction based detection that enables the administrator to
intuitively trace the visualized paths.
s7s6s5s4s3s2s1o5o4o3o2o1
o1
o2
o3
o4
o5
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
s6
s7
1
23
4
Trusted Untrusted
Object-Object or
Subject-Subject
Subject-Object or 
Object-Subject
Figure 4.3: Adjacency matrix-based policy visualization
The adjacency matrix is based on the policy graph definitions. Figure 4.3 shows our
proposed adjacency matrix visualization template. The nodes are arranged on both the
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X-axis and the Y-axis. To visualize a path P = {v0,v1, . . . ,vn} in the adjacency matrix, we
highlight entries (vi,vi) and (vi,vi+1), for i = 0, . . . ,n− 1. We draw an arc from entries
(vi,vi) and (vi,vi+1) for i = 0, . . . ,n− 1, and we draw an arc from entries (vi−1,vi) and
(vi,vi+1) for i = 1, . . . ,n−1. Figure 4.3 shows the visualization of path P = {s2,o2,s4,o1}.
The series of arcs carry all information of the original path. In our template the subjects
and objects are arranged on both the X-axis and the Y-axis. Furthermore, the grid is divided
into four quadrants:
• Quadrant 1: A slot (si,o j) signifies that a subject si can write to an object o j. We
refer to this quadrant as the write quadrant.
• Quadrant 2: A slot (si,s j) signifies that a subject si can call a subject s j.
• Quadrant 3: A slot (oi,s j) signifies that an object oi can read by a subject s j. We
refer to this quadrant as the read quadrant.
• Quadrant 4: A slot (oi,oi) is used to enable the transition.
Based on the above assignments, the path P = {s2,s2,s4,o1} represents the information
flow write(s2,o2), read(s4,o2) and write(s4,o1). Referring to definitions of flow transition
and information flow paths, an information flow path is a sequence of write operations
followed by a read operation, in our proposed adjacency matrix template. This requires the
path visiting the write quadrant then the read quadrant. Therefore, information flow paths
always follow a clock-wise direction. Using this property, an administrator can easily find
the directed path information by scanning the adjacency matrix template.
Furthermore, we use different colors to represent trusted, and non-trusted entities in the
adjacency matrix to express the policy violation graph. For example, red and grey represent
the trusted and non-trusted entities respectively.
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4.3 Querying Security Policy
Users have difficulty in writing or formulating a query [61]. The idea of the visual
query formulation is to help system administrators specify precise queries on the policy
base using an interactive querying technique which is based on visualization. Using an
approach similar to the Query-by-Example (QBE) method for querying relational data [50,
51], a graphical user interface allows users to write queries. Our approach provides a user
interface and a policy graph that enables the administrator to create and run queries against
the policy base. The queries are generated by connecting our proposed query operators
to formulate the intended information flows. The query operators are designed to provide
functionalities adopted by the previous policy analysis mechanisms [10, 55].
NTCB TCBObjectSubjectLabel
(a) Element Nodes (a’) Element Nodes Examples
(b) Operator Edge
label
write read have
Indirectly flow to
call
Indirectly flow from Indirectly have
(c) Element Annotation
text
text
(d) Operator Annotation
(b’) Operator Edge Examples
(c’) Element Annotation Examples
(d’) Operator Annotation Example
* ? “user_r” “dpkg_*” {“user_t”, “staff_t”, “sysadm_t”}1) 2) 3) 4) 5)
1) * 2)  5 3)  >=5 4)  shortest 5)  time limited <1min
(f) Basic Join Construction
(g) Example of Combined Join Construction
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B
C1) simple join 2) tuple-sharing join 3)  merge join
F
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C
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Figure 4.4: Query construction
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4.3.1 Basic Query Formulation
Our framework provides an interactive drag and drop query platform that enables
the administrators to issue information flow queries by simply connecting the provided
components. Our proposed graphical query language is designed to cope with usability
issues that the current policy analysis frameworks suffer [10, 55]. We define the basic
visual components shown in Figure 4.4, as follows:
• Element Nodes (E-Nodes) are shaped as labeled circles; their label represents the
attributes of the element such as subject, object, TCB, TCB(d) or NON-TCB.
• Operator Edge (O-Edge) is represented as the curve that connects the element nodes
to another element nodes. The label of the operator edges represents the query
classification of the query. Based on the query classification, the operator edges
include write, read, call, have, indirect have, indirect flow to, SOD and indirect SOD.
• Element Nodes Annotation (EN-Annotation) is to specify the element nodes value.
It can be a single value such as subject name, or a set of value, e.g.,{subject1,
subject2....subjectn}. When the policy administrator draws the query, this value can
not be omitted but can be partially specified as the wildcards “?” and “*” denote any
character and any sequence of characters respectively.
• Operator Edges Annotation (OE-Annotation) is to specify the query requirement and
determines the return graph of the query. For example, to query the information flow
path from one node to the other node, we can specify to find shortest path, all the path
or partial path. Here, the default (null) value represents to find all the path, which is
the same as “*”.
4.3.2 Query Classification
Based on the proposed domain-based isolation model, we are required to identify the
domain TCB and possible information flows from NON-TCB to TCB or TCB(d). In
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Figure 4.5: Example query classification and results
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addition, for the other existing query-based policy analysis tools [55], they also mainly
focus on identifying information flow relationships between different nodes. Based on our
formulation mechanisms, we provide a set of basic query classes that can be enabled by
the policy administrator to query the policy base. These supported query classifications
can satisfy the requirements including the policy analysis based on domain-based isolation
model and can support the basic information flow query supported by other existing policy
analysis tools.
C1. Node to Node information flow paths. This would enable to query an information
flow from a specific subject such as NON-TCB subject to a specific object such as
TCB object. The example in Figure 4.5(a’) shows the query result in the form of the
information flow path from a subject s1 to an object o2 (shown in Figure 4.5(a)).
C2. Group to Groups information flow paths. This would enable to query an information
flow from NON-TCB subjects to TCB and TCB(d) subjects. The example in
Figure 4.5(b) and (b’) respectively shows a path query and the query result from
NON-TCB to TCB and TCB(d).
C3. Node (Group) to Group (Node) information flow paths. This would enable to query
an information flow from one subject such as NON-TCB subject to the objects
such as TCB(d) objects, or from the NON-TCB to other subject. The example in
Figure 4.5(c) and (c’) respectively shows a query and the query result of finding
information flow paths from all NON-TCB to the TCB subject s4.
C4. Node to Node information flow paths through another Node. To find information flow
from one type to another type through a certain type, where types can be subjects or
objects. The example in Figure 4.5(d) and (d’) respectively shows a query and the
query result of finding an information flow path from a subject s1 to a subject s5
through an object o3.
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C5. Element query. This would enable to query the information domain subjects and
objects and domain TCB subjects and objects. The example in Figure 4.5(e) and (e’)
shows a query and the query result of finding NON-TCB subjects.
4.3.3 Join Query Construction
Based on the construction of the basic policy query, we describe the join query modes
which are constructed based on the shared E-Nodes. The policy administrator can use the
join query to construct more complex queries such as finding the domain that can both write
and read the goal protected objects. Also, using the join query the policy administrator can
accumulate several query results on a single graph. Here, we summarize three main join
query modes: Simple Join, Merge Join and Tuple-sharing Join.
• Simple Join specifies that a set of E-Nodes is connected in sequence through the
O-Edges; Given E-Nodes ni, n j, nk and O-Edges oi,o j, if oi(ni,n j) and o j(n j,nk),
then we say there is a simple join.
• Tuple-sharing Join specifies that two or more E-Nodes are connected from the
same E-Node through the O-Edges; Given E-Nodes ni, n j, nk and O-Edges oi,o j,
if oi(ni,nk) and o j(ni,n j), then we say there is a tuple-sharing join.
• Merge Join specifies that two or more E-Nodes are merged into one E-Node through
the O-Edges; Given E-Nodes ni, n j, nk and O-Edges oi,o j, if oi(ni,n j) and o j(nk,n j),
then we say there is a merge join.
Based on the three identified join modes, the policy query can be further constructed
into more complex structure as shown in Figure 4.4(f).
4.3.4 Query Execution
Based on the definitions of the join query construction, the identification of the different
join format can facilitate the query execution. The paths are simply computed using the
shortest path algorithm such as Dijkstra algorithm. The query execution makes use of
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Algorithm [Execute Policy Query]
Input:   The Policy Query graph Gq
Output:  The Policy graph G with query result
Method:
(1) Nlist = getElementNodes(Gq) /* get all the nodes in query graph
(2) FOR each na ∈ Nlist DO
(3)  Elist= getConnectEdges(na, Gq) /* get all the edges of node na
(4)  FOR each e ∈ Elist DO
(5)             nb=findConnectNode(e, na, Gq)  /* get the connected node of na
(6) If nb. getMergeNodes(nb) !=NULL Then
(7)                   na = na - nb. getMergeNodes(nb, e) /* na  remove the duplication 
caused by merge join
(8) If na. getTupleNode(na) !=NULL Then
(9)                   nb = nb - na. getTupleNode(na, e) /* nb remove the duplication caused 
by tuple-sharing join
(10)            If na !=NULL && nb !=NULL Then
(11)                  queryExecution(na, e, nb, Gq ) /* execute the query
(12)            na.addTupleNode (nb , e) /* save the data of nb to na for the tuple-sharing
(13)            nb.addMergeNode (na, e) /* save the data of na to nb for the merge join
Figure 4.6: Query execution algorithm
the shared nodes between group nodes. For example, in the tuple-sharing join (shown in
Figure 4.4), suppose A is NTCB, B is TCB, C is fsadm_t and the O-Edges have the same
annotation. Since fsadm_t belongs to TCB, the query only needs to be executed from A to
B. Similarly, in the merge join, if D is NTCB and E is a subset of NTCB (e.g. xdm_t) or
shares labels with the NTCB. In this case the query evaluates paths from D to F then the
paths from E - (E ∩ D) to F.
As the algorithm shown in Figure 4.6, the policy query execution algorithm is mainly
composed of two main parts. In the first part, the algorithm identifies all the E-Nodes from
the query graph using the function getElementNodes(Gq), then for each E-Node na, it finds
all the outgoing O-Edges connected to node na using getConnectEdges(na,Gq). In the
second part, for each of the identified edges e in the previous step, the algorithm identifies
the connected nodes of nb which is retrieved by the function f indConnectNode(e,na,Gq).
The two cases of merge query and tuple sharing are checked and the duplication is removed.
If na and nb are part of the merge query, the duplicated nodes are removed from na by using
the expression na−nb.getMergeNodes(nb,e) and the merge join nodes are stored in the nb
attribute and can be retrieved with the expression nb.getMergeNodes(nb,e). On the other
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hand, if na and nb are part of tuple-sharing, the duplication of nb with the expression nb−
na.getTupleNode(na,e), where the tuple-sharing nodes are maintained in the na attribute
and can be retrieved with the expression na.getTupleNode(na,e). After the information
duplication is removed, the query from na to nb with an operator e is executed. Finally, the
executed queries are added to the graph by adding the nodes and edge information into na
and nb respectively using functions na.addTupleNode(nb) and nb.addMergeNode(na).
(c) Policy Violation Graph Solving through adding new object O2 which can be read by subject s3 (d) Policy Violation Graph Solving through removing read operation between TCB or TCB(d) subject S3 and O1
SO Sc1 Sc2 Sc3Oc1 Oc2 Ocms1s3 o1 Scns2 SO Sc1 Sc2 Sc3Oc1 Oc2 Ocms1s3 o1 Scns2o2
(a) Policy Violation Graph: S1 and  S2 are NON-TCB subject which can flow to TCB or TCB(d) subject S3  through object  O1 (b)  Policy Violation  Graph Solving through Filter, which can be transited by NON-TCB and TCB subjects and can read, write object O1
SO Sc1 Sc2 Sc3Oc1 Oc2 Ocms1s3 o1 Scns2 SO Sc1 Sc2 Sc3Oc1 Oc2 Ocms1s3 o1 Scns2
Figure 4.7: Policy violation and modification example graphs
4.4 Policy Violations and Resolutions in Graph
With a generated policy violation graph, we introduce different approaches to modify
the policy graph, remove policy violations and illustrate the expected graph-based result
after the modification. Based on the policy violation resolution strategies discussed in
DIM, other than ignoring a policy violation through adding related subjects to system or
domain TCBs, we can remove the violation by importing a filter subject. Comparing with
45
Figure 4.7 (a) with violation resolved graph in Figure 4.7 (b), write and read operations
by the NON-TCB and TCB are removed, transition relationships between subjects and the
filter are added, and the policy violations caused by NON-TCB subjects S1 and S2 are
resolved. Another optional way for resolving policy violations is to import new subjects or
objects to restrict original subjects or objects privileges. As shown in Figure 4.7 (c), new
object o2 is introduced so the information flows between NON-TCB and TCB are removed.
Also, we can resolve the policy violations through deleting related policy statements. As
shown in Figure 4.7 (d), the read operation between an object o1 and TCB subject S3 is
removed to resolve policy violations between NON-TCB and TCB.
CHAPTER 5: POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
In this Chapter, we discuss the implementation details of our proposed framework policy
visualization analysis tool (PVA). We then discuss how PVA tool can be used to identify the
policy violations in the SELinux policy. Finally, we prove the usability of our tool through
performing a user study.
5.1 Visualization-based Policy Analysis and Management Framework
Our policy analysis framework includes Policy Analysis Modules, System Components,
and Data Flow for policy analysis as shown in Figure 6.1. Policy Analysis Modules
are composed of several analysis components such as TCB Domain Identification,
Domain-based Isolation Model, and Resolution of Policy Violation that are designed based
on the policy analysis methodology in Chapter 3. For the System Components, the Policy
Parsing Module is to parse and map the operations between types to write_like, read_like,
and call operations. For example, the operation like getattr can be mapped to a read_like
operation. TCB(d) is discovered and inserted into the policies using the TCB Domain
Identification module in Policy Analysis Modules. In the Policy Visualization Module,
the policies are visualized into different graphs based on the User Input Event. Then
through executing the designed policy queries, t he Analysis Report Module generates
the Policy Violations Express in Graph. In addition, this module supports the policy
modification performed by Policy Violation module. The Decision Flows components
govern all processes in our framework.
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Figure 5.1: Policy visualization-based analysis and management framework
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5.2 Visualization-based Policy Analysis and Management Tool (PVA)
5.2.1 Design Principles
The PVA tool is based on a self-explanatory graphical user interface. To enhance the
cognition and understanding of the policy information, we provide implementations of
both semantic substrates-based and adjacency matrix-based visualization layouts. Another
important aspect of our design is to be expressive and directly mapped to the real system
policy analysis. By providing a visualization based policy query platform, our design
enables the administrator to build a query by example.
5.2.2 PVA Tool Implementation Details
Our implementation is based on the Java JDK1.6 and supporting libraries. The graph
drawing modules are based on our extensions to the open source package Piccolo [19]. Our
parsing tool is based on the policy structure adopted by the APOL [10] tool. Figure 5.2(a)
shows a snapshot of the our tool. The policy administrator can interactively import,
analyze, query and modify the policy. The left window is composed of two parts: semantic
substrates-based visualization and adjacency matrix-based visualization, and each window
includes the tabs for view, analysis, and violation. The view tab provides the GUI for
the policy graph overview, content view and detail view including zoom in and zoom out
features. The analysis tab supports the analysis of the policy by enabling the administrator
to select the security goals of interest and ultimately locate the policy violation with the help
of the query function. The violation tab displays all the policy statements that are involved
in security violations. Furthermore, in this tab the policy administrator can directly modify
the policy by using the text editor or directly editing the policy graph. In the main window,
the policy graphs, query results, goal related policy graphs and the policy violation graphs
are displayed.
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Figure 5.2: Policy visualization-based analysis and management tool
5.2.3 Policy Graph
The main window in Figure 5.2(a) shows the visualized SELinux policy based on our
semantic substrates design, in which there are 1,337 nodes, and 11,134 links. The Y-axis is
divided into four regions including USER (3 nodes), ROLE (6 nodes), DOMAINS(308
nodes) and TYPES(1,092 nodes). The X-axis is labeled with the domain and type
classifications as we discussed in SELinux overview. The domain regions are divided
into four different areas SD (System Domain), DAE (Daemons Domain), PRO (Program
Domain) and ULO (User Login Domain). The type regions are divided into seven different
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areas ST (security types), DT (devpts types), FT (file types), PT (procfs types), DE (devpts
types), NF (nfs types), and NE (network types). To help a policy administrator to easily
identify the different regions, the elements in non-neighboring regions are represented as
different shapes, for example users and domains are expressed with circle, and roles and
types are expressed with rectangle. The edges between different regions are represented
by different colored lines, for example the write operation between a domain and type are
represented by red edges and the read operations by green edges. Also, policy administrator
can view node attributes by clicking on the specific nodes. Figure 5.2(b), shows the
adjacency matrix-based policy visualization method, which was compiled by selecting a
subset of the nodes in the semantic substrates overlay.
As an example, we use Apache web server as a target service domain to achieve high
integrity. We first identify subjects and objects belonging to Apache domain. We then
specify Apache TCB(d), list the policy violations identified against our integrity model,
and resolve them with different principles.
5.2.3.1 Apache Domain Identification
To identify subjects and objects for Apache domain, we have the following queries
constructed for Apache information domain identification.
• Key word-based policy subjects or objects query As discussed earlier, we use
http as a keyword prefix. As a result, subjects and objects such as httpd_t and
httpd_php_t are included into Apache domain. Figure 5.3.I.(a) shows the query.
• Direct flow-based subjects or objects query To investigate Apache domain subjects
and objects based on direct flows, we construct the query shown in Figure 5.3.I.(b). In
this query, we discover all subjects and objects that have a direct flow to the initially
identified Apache subjects and objects and include them into Apache domain.
Table 3.1 shows a selected list of subjects and objects that we detected.
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(III). Policy violation caused by http_port_t is solved through 
adding networkfilter into the related policies. 
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Figure 5.3: Policy violation identification and modification for Apache
5.2.3.2 Apache TCB(d) Identification
For domain TCB identification steps described in DIM, we query TCB(d) for an
information domain according to the following steps.
• Transition-based subjects query To query a TCB(d), we first identify TCB(d) based
on subject dependencies considering all associated entities. Running the query shown
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in Figure 5.3.I.(c), we get initial TCB(d) subjects from Apache information domain.
Specifically, our analysis shows that all subject domains in Apache related policy
rules include a set of domain relationships since a domain httpd_t can transit to
other httpd domains such as httpd_php_t and so on. Thus, a subject labeled with
httpd_t is a predominant subject which launches other subjects in Apache server.
Similarly, a subject labeled with httpd_suexec_t is also a predominant subject
since this domain can transit to most entities in other httpd domains. Naturally,
httpd_t and httpd_suexec_t are included into Apache TCB(d).
• Indirect flow-based subjects query To identify all subjects that can transit
only to the initially identified TCB(d), we construct the query as shown in
Figure 5.3.I.(d)). Based on the generated query results, httpd_sysadm_script_t,
httpd_rotatelogs
_t and httpd_php_t can transit only to httpd_t and httpd_suexec_t other than
system TCB subjects.
5.2.3.3 Policy Violation Queries
To generate the policy violation graph, a query is constructed as shown in
Figure 5.3.I.(e), where we try to identify the policy violations from NON-TCB to TCB
caused by indirect information flow. Figure 5.3 II shows the details of policy violation
graph generation based on query. The query operations, NON-TCB, TCB and TCB(d) are
elaborated in a file Ftcb. Also, NON-TCB, TCB and TCB(d) subject nodes are separately
colored. Then we discover all flow transitions from NON-TCB subjects to system TCB
subjects or TCB(d) subjects. Note that it is optional for a policy administrator to specify
queries from NON-TCB to TCBs through specifying the exact subject names rather than
using “*”.
As an example of system TCB isolation violations, Table 5.1 includes all identified
policy violations caused by NON-TCB subjects flowing into TCB subjects fsadm_t,
snmpd_t, and mount_t. Also, Table 5.2 shows all policy violations identified for protecting
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Apache information domain.
Table 5.1: Fsadm_t related policy violations example
Subject Type:Class Subject Resolution
200 network fsadm_t Filter
rhgb_t, smpmount_t mnt_t:dir fsadm_t Modify
hotplug_t etc_runtime_t:file fsadm_t Ignore
33 unpriv_userdomain:fd use fsadm_t Modify
134 initrc_t:fifo_file fsadm_t Modify
16 removable_device_t:chr_file fsadm_t Modify
sysadm_cdrecord_t, user_cdrecord_t, staff_cdrecord_t scsi_generic_device_t:chr_file fsadm_t Modify
200 network snmpd_t Filter
rhgb_t, smpmount_t mnt_t:dir snmpd_t Modify
hotplug_t etc_runtime_t:file snmpd_t Ignore
200 devtty_t:chr_file snmpd_t Modify
134 initrc_t:fifo_file snmpd_t Modify
131 initrc_devpts_t:chr_file snmpd_t Modify
200 network mount_t Filter
rhgb_t, smbmount_t mnt:dir mount_t Ignore
hotplug_t etc_runtime_t:file mount_t Ignore
16 removable_device_t:chr_file mount_t Modify
200 devtty_t: chr_file mount_t Modify
134 initrc_t:fifo_file mount_t Modify
3 sysadm_tty_device_t: chr_file mount_t Modify
131 initrc_devpts_t:chr_file mount_t Modify
25 sysadm_devpts_t:chr_file mount_t Modify
16 removable_device_t:chr_file mount_t Modify
5.2.3.4 Policy Violation Resolution
Based on the identified policy violations, TCB and TCB(d) integrity are violated
because NON-TCB subjects have write_like operations on objects that can be read by
TCB(d) subjects. Retrieving the method of policy violation resolution, we resolve the
policy violations with the following methods.
Adjust TCB(d) After policy violations are identified, Apache TCB(d) is required to be
adjusted and policy violations should be removed. As shown in Table 5.2, httpd_awstat
s_script_t can flow to TCB(d) subjects through httpd_awstats_script_rw_t. At
the same time, it is flown in by many NON-TCB subjects through some common types
such as devtty_t. Hence, we ignore the violations caused by this awstats_script and
include it into TCB(d). Similar situation occurs for httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t and
httpd_prewikka_script_t. However, httpd_staff_script_t cannot be included into
TCB(d) since it would lead the unlimited file access for the staff services such as staff_t,
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Table 5.2: Policy violations of Apache domain
Policy Violations
NON-TCB Type:Class TCB(d) Subject Solve
270 *_node_t: node TCB(d) subjects Filter
270 *_port_t: tcp_socket TCB(d) subjects Filter
270 netif_t: netif TCB(d) subjects Filter
6 subjects dns_client_packet_t :packet TCB(d) subjects Filter
6 subjects dns_port_t:packet TCB(d) subjects Filter
25 sysadm_devpts_t:chr_file httpd_t Modify
104 initrc_devpts_t: chr_file httpd_t,httpd_rotatelogs_t Modify
16 console_device_t: chr_file httpd_t,httpd_suexec_t Modify
270 devlog_t :sock_file httpd_t,httpd_suexec_t Modify
270 device_t:chr_file TCB(d) subjects Modify
270 devtty_t:chr_file TCB(d) subjects Modify
3 sysadm_tty_device_t:chr_file httpd_t Modify
5 urandom_device_t:chr_file httpd_t Modify
270 zero_device_t:chr_file TCB(d) subjects Modify
134 initrc_t:fifo_file TCB(d) subjects Modify
5 var_run_t:dir httpd_t Modify
72 var_log_t: dir httpd_t Modify
72 tmpfs_t:dir httpd_t Modify
httpd_staff_script_t httpd_staff_script_*_t:file httpd_t Modify
httpd_user_script_t httpd_user_script_*_t:file httpd_t Modify
httpd_sys_script_t httpd_sys_script_*_t:file httpd_t Modify
httpd_unconfined_script_t httpd_unconfined_script_*_t:file httpd_t Modify
webalizer_t httpd_sys_content_t:file httpd_t Modify
httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_*_t:file httpd_t Ignore
httpd_awstats_script_t httpd_awstats _script_*_t:file httpd_t Ignore
httpd_prewikka_script_t httpd_prewikka_script_*_t:file httpd_t Ignore
Further Policy Violations Example
NON-TCB Type:Class Adjusting Subject Solve
270 devtty_t:chr_file httpd_prewikka_script_t Modify
270 devtty_t:chr_file httpd_awstats_script_t Modify
270 devtty_t:chr_file httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t Modify
staff_mozilla_t, and staff_mplayer_t.
Remove Policy Rules Another way for resolving policy violations is to remove the
related policy statements. For example, webalizer_t is to label a tool for analyzing the
log files of web server and is not necessary to modify the information of web server. To
resolve the policy violations caused due to the write access to httpd_sys_content_t,
we remove the policy rule stating write_like operations between webalizer_t and
httpd_sys_content
_t.
Modify Policy Rules Many policy violations are caused because related subjects or
objects are given too much privileges. Hence, rather than just removing related policy
statements, we also need to replace these subjects or objects with more restricted rights. For
example, for policy violations caused by read and write accesses to initrc_devpts_t, our
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solution is to redefine initrc_devpts_t by introducing initrc_devpts_t, system_ini
trc_devpts_t, and *_daemon_initrc_devpts_t(* representing the corresponding
service name). Corresponding policy rules are also modified as follows:
allow httpd_t initrc_devpts_t:chr_file {ioctl read getattr lock
write append}; is changed to
allow httpd_t httpd_daemon_initrc_devpts_t:chr_file {ioctl read
getattr lock write append};
Add Filter Based on the domain-based integrity model, a filter is introduced into
policies to remove policy violations. For example, to remove the violations caused by
http_port_t, we introduce a network filter subject as follows:
allow user_xserver_t networkfilter_t:process transition;
allow networkfilter_t http_port_t:tcp_socket {recv_msg send_msg};
After the modification is applied, the original policy violations are eliminated. In
general, to validate the result of a policy modification, we recheck the relationships
between domains and types associated with the policy violations. Comparing Figure 5.3.II
with Figure 5.3.I, we can observe that all read operations between TCB(d) and type
http_port_t are removed. Also, the write operations between NON-TCB and
http_port_t are also removed. Instead, a new domain networkfilter_t is added, which
has write and read operations on http_port_t. Also, all TCB(d) and NON-TCB subjects
can transit to this new domain type.
5.3 User Study
To investigate the usability of PVM, we performed the user study from two perspectives.
One is to focus on PVM functionality for browsing and analyzing the security policy. For
this viewpoint, APOL is the only existing tool for policy browsing and analysis. Hence
we compared APOL with PVM to prove the policy browsing and analysis ability of PVM.
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In addition, based on DIM, PVM can identify policy violations and display them with
semantic-substrates and adjacency-matrix methods, respectively. Thus, we also asked the
participants to compare semantic-substrates and adjacency-matrix methods in visualizing
SELinux security policies and policy violations.
5.3.1 Participant Enrolling and Characteristics
We first contacted some student participants for the participant enrollment after giving
a guest lecture in the access control class. Other participants were enrolled after we invited
people from the information security lab, the network lab, the visualization lab, the human
computer interaction lab and system administrator office of the College of Computing and
Informatics. In addition, we emailed some people and get some participants who are Linux
experts or system administrators.
The sample for this study is consisted of 33 system administrators (15.2%), graduate
students (72.7%), and undergraduate students (12.1%) with different specializations within
computer science (69.7% information security; 6.1% computer networking; 6.1% database
systems; 6.1% computer graphics and visualization; and 12.1% other) of various ages
[12.1% were 18 2̃2 years old (y. o.), 42.4% are 22 2̃6 y. o., 30.3% are 26 3̃0 y. o.,
and 15.2% are 30 4̃0 y. o.]. Participants differ in terms of their most frequently used
OS (15.2% Linux; 72.7% Windows; and 12.1% Mac OS), the frequency with which they
change OS configuration settings (27.3% never; 54.5% monthly; 12.1% weekly; and 6.1%
daily), the frequency with which they configure or check their OS security policies (30.3%
never; 54.5% monthly; 6.1% weekly; and 9.1% daily), whether or not they use special
software tools to manage their OS security policies (21.2% use special software tools;
63.6% do not use special software tools; and 15.2% do not know whether or not they use
special software tools), the extent to which they agree that configuring security policies
is an important task (3% strongly disagree; 0% disagree; 0% neither agree not disagree;
45.5% agree; and 51.5% strongly agree), and the amount of time they would be willing to
spend on configuring a security policy (6.1% no time; 33.3% up to 15 minutes; 30.3% up
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to 30 minutes; 6.1% up to 1 hour; 3% up to 2 hours; and 21.2% more than 2 hours).
5.3.2 Policy Used
The participants were asked to analyze the same security policies with APOL and PVM.
The policy we choose is real SELinux policies from major publisher. We chose this policy
for the following reasons:
• It would be necessary to to simulate the realistic situation that the policy
administrator might counter in practice.
• It would also essential to consider the reasonable size of security policies so that the
user study in both APOL and PVM would be more convenient to the participants.
The size of the security policy in our user study is approximately 200KB.
5.3.3 Instruction
 
Execute the policy 
analysis 
View the policy 
analysis details 
Analysis result tree  
Policy analysis 
options  
Policy browsing 
and analysis  
Figure 5.4: APOL tool introduction
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To give ideas about how to use APOL and PVM and how to compare the two
visualization mechanisms in PVM, other than communicating the SELinux policy
knowledge to the participants, an instruction was provided with screen shots in two main
parts (APOL and PVM sample results are shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.4), instead of
explaining the SELinux policy to all participants.
In the first part of the instruction, we described how to use APOL and PVM to browse
and analyze the security policy with the same tasks. The participants were instructed
to load the security policy and browse any contents they were interested in. Then the
participants were required to follow the instructions to complete the tasks including (1)
identifying the information types containing gcon, (2) identifying all the direct information
flow flowing out from jvm_t , (3) identifying direct information flow from jvm_t to
java_t, (4) identifying indirect information flow from test_t to user_install_t ,
(5) identifying direct information flow from jvm_t, test_t to root_t , (6) identifying
information flow from jvm_t to sysxo_t through root_t , (7) identifying direct
information flow from group1= {test_t, jvm_t} to group 2={xo_t, root_t} and
group 3={user_install_var_t, user_install_exec_t}, (8) repeating step 6 and step
7 to see the combined result of analysis. In addition, the participants were asked to play
the tool freely to see such as how the interface was designed, how the security policy was
composed, and other experimental interests.
The second part of the instruction mainly elaborated how to use semantic-substrates and
adjacency-matrix methods separately to visualize the security policy, read information from
the visualized policy, generate and display security policy violations against predefined
security goals, and identify the reasons of the existing policy violation such as why an
untrusted domain user_install_t can flow to a trusted domain sysxo_t (semantic
substrates and adjacency matrix sample figures shown in Figure 5.2).
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5.3.4 User Study Measurement
In the questionnaire, we design the total 20 items to get the participant attitude towards
measurements including the ease of constructing queries, the ease of understanding policy
analysis results and the overall ease of using the tool interface. Among these measurement,
the first two items are to measure PVM and APOL in policy analysis aspect and the
latter is to focus on policy browsing, understanding and the overall experience of the tool
interface. For each measurement, since we designed the same items for APOL and PVM,
we summarize our measurement items with one of methods-APOL–as follows.
5.3.4.1 Ease of Constructing Policy Analysis
Ease of constructing queries (α = .90) using APOL and PVM for policy analysis was
measured with 4 items. Participants were asked to rate how easy the processes described in
the items using the APOL and the PVM functions are with a 5-point rating scale (1= very
complicated to 5 = very easy). The four items for APOL were listed as “ combining several
analysis requests are: ” “ composing a policy analysis in APOL was:” “ using APOL to
analyze was:” and “ figuring out what to analyze with APOL was:”
5.3.4.2 Ease of Understanding Policy Analysis Results
Ease of understanding the query results (α = .81) using APOL and PVM for policy
analysis was measured by 3 items with a 5-point rating scale (1= strongly disagree to 5 =
strongly agree). The items are composed of “ the analysis result in APOL can be easily
investigated,” “ the entities relationship in the analysis can be identified easily,” and “ the
different analysis result can be easily combined.”
5.3.4.3 Overall Experience of Using the Tool Interface
Overall ease of use for APOL and PVM interfaces (α = .90) was measured by 3 items
with a 5-point scale (1= strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). The sample items include
“ browsing and understanding the security policy using APOL is:” “ you would like to use
APOL interface for policy analysis,” and “ the APOL interface shows how the different
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types and domains are inter-connected.”
5.3.5 Measurement for Semantic-substrates versus Adjacency-matrix
To get the idea of participants experience to our visualization methods, we designed the
total 18 items focusing on three aspects including ease of identifying policy violations, ease
of tracing policy violation elements, and satisfaction with the policy visualization. For each
measure, the same items were developed for semantic-substrates and adjacency-matrix
methods. In the following, we summarize the measurement items of our user study for
those visualization methods.
5.3.5.1 Ease of Identifying Policy Violations
Ease of identifying policy violations (α = .75) using the semantic-substrates and
adjacency-matrix methods were measured by 3 items with a 5-point rating scale (1=
strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). The sample items are composed of “ the policy
violation identification of semantic-substrates is easy to perform,” “ the untrusted domain
and trusted domain in semantic-substrates are easy to identify,” and “ it is very flexible in
semantic-substrates for identifying different policy violations.”
5.3.5.2 Ease of Tracing Policy Violation Elements
Ease of tracing policy violation elements (α = .72) using the semantic-substrates
and adjacency-matrix method were measured by 3 items with a 5-point rating scale (1=
strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). The items include “ semantic-substrates is easy
to trace back domains and types included in a policy violation,” “ it is easy to identify
transitions between trusted and untrusted domains in semantic-substrates,” and “ it is easy
to understand the policy violation in semantic-substrates.”
5.3.5.3 Satisfaction With the Visualization Policy
Satisfaction with the visualization policy (α = .73) using the semantic-substrates and
adjacency-matrix methods were measured by 3 items. Participants were asked to rate the
degree to which they liked different aspects of the two policy visualization methods with a
61
5-point rating scale (1= do not like at all to 5 = like it very much). The sample items are “
viewing specific policy element relationships (domains and types),” “ this visualization is
intuitive and is easy to use,” and “ the visualization is clear, not crowded and not cluttered.”
5.3.6 Procedure
To perform the user study, we installed APOL and PVM in our lab machine in an
independent room without having any unexpected interruptions to the participants. The
participants were required to come to our lab for the experiments. They first opened and
browsed the security policies, which were then analyzed using APOL and PVM based
on our instructions. Then the participants were required to visualize and identify security
policy violations with semantic-substrates and adjacency-matrix methods. With these steps,
the participants were required to use the same example SELinux policy.
After completing the policy analysis, participants were asked to complete a post-session
questionnaire to assess their experience with the two tools and two visualization methods,
their experiences with security policy analysis, their general control inclinations, and their
demographic characteristics.
5.3.7 Data Collection
In our questionnaire design, we implemented the questionnaire using the lime survey
tool [2] and posted it on our lab server. For each participant, our lab sever recorded their
answers to the questions, whether or not they finished the questions. All these answers
were stored and could be exported through a database for the later analysis.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 PVM versus APOL Results
APOL PVM
Measure items Mean SD Mean SD
Ease of constructing queries 2.78 .94 4.36 .41
Ease of understanding query results 3.13 .78 4.32 .40
Overall ease of using the interface 2.41 .86 4.42 .43
Table 5.3: PVM versus APOL.
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Paired samples t-tests [4] were conducted in order to compare participants’ experience
towards the two approaches to policy analysis. Corresponding to each measurement, we
obtained the following results (shown in Table 5.3).
• Ease of constructing queries: Through calculating the answers from the participants
for this measurement, the satisfaction tendency for APOL is (M=2.78, SD= .94),
compared to PVM (M = 4.36, SD = .41). Therefore, constructing queries with PVM
is perceived to be significantly easier than constructing queries with APOL (t(32) =
-9.67, p < .001)
• Ease of understanding query results: Based on the three answers from the
participants for this measurement, the satisfaction tendency for APOL is (M = 3.13,
SD = .78), compared to PVM (M = 4.32, SD = .40). Hence, understanding query
results with PVM is also perceived to be significantly easier than understanding
queries with APOL (t(32) = -9.07, p < .001).
• Overall ease of using the interface: The user study indicates that the satisfaction
tendency for APOL is (M=2.41, SD = .86), compared to PVM (M=4.42, SD = .43).
Hence, the overall PVM interface is perceived to be significantly easier to use than
the APOL interface (t(32) = -11.82, p < .001).
In summary, the participants clearly indicated that all examined aspects of the PVM
approach to policy analysis are easier than the corresponding aspects of the APOL
approach.
5.4.2 Semantic-substrates versus Adjacency-matrix Results
semantic-substrates adjacency-matrix
Measure items Mean SD Mean SD
Satisfaction with the visualization policy 4.36 .50 4.11 .65
Ease of identifying policy violations 4.40 .40 4.17 .64
Interpretability of visualization results 4.23 .64 3.99 .70
Table 5.4: Semantic-substrates comparing Adjacency-matrix
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Paired samples t-tests [4] were also conducted in order to compare participants’
experience towards two visualization methods for policy analysis and policy violation
visualization. Based on the measurement criteria, we obtained the following results (shown
in Table 5.4) with a 5-point rating score (1= do not like at all to 5 = like it very much).
• Ease of identifying policy violations: Through calculating the answers from the
participants for this measurement, the satisfaction tendency for semantic-substrates is
(M=4.40, SD= .40), compared to adjacency-matrix (M = 4.17, SD = .64). Therefore,
identifying policy violations with the semantic-substrates visualization is perceived
to be significantly easier than identifying policy violations with the adjacency-matrix
visualization (t(32) = 2.21, p < .05).
• Satisfaction with the visualization policy: Based on the answers from the participants
for this measurement, although there is a tendency for participants to be more
satisfied with the semantic-substrate visualization (M = 4.36, SD = .50), compared
to the adjacency-matrix visualization (M = 4.11, SD = .65), this tendency is not
significant (t(32) = 1.98, p = .056).
• Interpretability of visualization results: The user study also indicates that the
satisfaction tendency for semantic-substrates is (M=4.23, SD= .64), compared to
adjacency-matrix (M = 3.99, SD = .70). Therefore, interpreting the visualization
results with both methods is perceived to be similar (t(32) = 1.98, p < .056).
In summary, although there is a tendency for participants’ perceptions of the
semantic-substrates visualization to be more favorable, compared to their perceptions of
the adjacency-matrix visualization, this tendency is only significant with regards to the
ease of identifying policy violations.
5.5 Lessons Learned
Our evaluations of PVM were carried out through the steps presented in the previous
sections. We summarize some lessons that we have learned from the user study.
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Lesson 1: Ensure that participants understand the assigned task .
Communicating clearly with survey participants and confirming the participants with
the proper information before the survey were crucial. We found out that the best way to
perform the user study is to repeatedly remind the participants what they understood and
what they needed to do.
Lesson 2: Test materials before sending out It is very important to run a pre-test before
starting the survey. In our experiment, the researchers tested all the materials including
instruction, tools and questionnaire first. Then we invited few participants to test our
materials and setup, so that the design of the overall experiment could be fully debugged,
modified and validated.
Lesson 3: Use as little paper work as possible Initially, we designed the paper-based
questionnaire but the paper work caused significant overhead for analyzing and maintaining
user study data. Hence, we changed the questionnaire to be the online-based one, which
brought the benefits of taking care of answering sessions, data collection, analysis, and
backup.
Lesson 4: Minimize the chances that participants may make mistake Minimizing the
chances that participants may make mistakes unrelated to the user study is a challenging
problem. For example, some participants were confused with PVM since it displays the
results on two display panes.
Lesson 5: Understand Limitations of User Study Due to the availability of current policy
analysis tool and survey participants, we identified several limitations. First, we could only
use the most sophisticated tool APOL to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of our
PVM tool. This biased attempt would not be a fair to PVM. Second, since APOL does not
have trusted and untrusted concepts in the tool, we were not able to compare this important
characteristics of PVM with APOL.
CHAPTER 6: DYNAMIC REMOTE ATTESTATION
In distributed computing environments, it is crucial to measure whether remote parties
run buggy, malicious application codes or are improperly configured by rogue software.
Remote attestation techniques have been proposed for this purpose through analyzing
the integrity of remote systems to determine their trustworthiness. Typical attestation
mechanisms are designed based on the following steps. First, an attestation requester
(attester) sends a challenge to a target system (attestee), which responds with the evidence
of integrity of its hardware and software components. Second, the attester derives runtime
properties of the attestee and determines the trustworthiness of the attestee. Finally and
optionally, the attester returns the attestation result, such as integrity measurement status,
to the attestee. Remote attestation can help reduce potential risks that are caused by a
tampered system.
Various attestation approaches and techniques have been proposed. Trusted Computing
Group (TCG) [11] specifies trusted platform module (TPM) which can securely store
and provide integrity measurements of systems to a remote party. Integrity measurement
mechanisms have been proposed to facilitate the capabilities of TPM at application level.
For instance, Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) [53] is an implementation of
TCG approach to provide verifiable evidence with respect to the current run-time state
of a measured system. However, IMA does not provide a comprehensive attestation
mechanism, which evaluates the trustworthiness of a target system with the measurements.
Several attestation methods have been proposed to accommodate privacy properties [23],
system behaviors [32], and information flow model [35]. However, these existing
approaches still need to cope with the efficiency when attesting a platform where its
system state frequently changes due to system-centric events such as security policy
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updates and software package installations. In addition, an efficient attestation mechanism
should be especially considered for dealing with such a dynamic nature of systems
since the frequency of system changes and the volume of system state information
would be tremendously increased due to the recent technological innovation of distributed
computing. Last but not least, existing attestation mechanisms do not have an effective and
intuitive way for presenting attestation results and reflecting such results while resolving
identified security violations.
Due to these attestation requirements, our policy analysis and management work is
required to be extended. First, based on our original analysis and management framework,
we are required to extend this tool to realize policy updates rather than analyzing a
whole policy. Second, based on the policy violation graph identified through our policy
management work, a ranking mechanism is required to prioritize the policy violations,
and thus provides the method for describing the trustworthiness of different system states
with risk levels. Other than these extension work, remote attestation mechanisms are also
required to be proposed and developed, e.g., how the attestee can measure its codes and
data and generate the policy updates, and how the attester can reliably get these attestee
information.
As a summary, the following lists the objectives we would like to achieve for this part
of research.
• Extend existing policy visualization-based analysis and management framework,
develop a dynamic attestation framework built based on this extension, and solve
the issues including verifying the system efficiently and describing the attestation
result effectively.
• Demonstrate the feasibility of proposed approach through prototype
implementations, which incorporate a component extended from the
visualization-based policy analysis and management tool, and other remote
attestation related components.
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• Evaluate the performance of the attestation prototype, and prove the efficiency and
effectiveness of our dynamic attestation framework.
In the follows, Section 6.1 overviews existing attestation work and system integrity
models. Section 6.2 presents the design requirements and attestation procedures of
DR@FT, followed by policy analysis methods and their usages in Section 6.3. We elaborate
the implementation details and evaluation results in Section 6.4, and conclude this Chapter
in Section 6.5.
6.1 Background
6.1.1 Attestation
The TCG specification [11] defines mechanisms for a TPM-enabled platform to report
its current hardware and software configuration status to a remote challenger. A TCG
attestation process is composed of two steps: (i) an attestee platform measures hardware
and software components starting from BIOS block and generates a hash value. The hash
value is then stored into a TPM Platform Configuration Register (PCR). Recursively, it
measures BIOS loader and operating system (OS) in the same way and stores them into
TPM PCRs; (ii) an attester obtains the attestee’s digital certificate with an attestation
identity key (AIK), AIK-signed PCR values, and a measurement log file from the attestee
which is used to reconstruct the attestee platform configuration, and verifies whether this
configuration is acceptable. From these steps we notice that TCG measurement process
is composed of a set of sequential steps up to the bootstrap loader. Thus, TCG does not
provide effective mechanisms for measuring a system’s integrity beyond the system boot,
especially considering the randomness of executable contents loaded by OS.
IBM IMA [53] extends TCG’s measurement scope to application level. A measurement
list M is stored in OS kernel and composed of m0 ... mi corresponding to loaded executable
application codes. For each loaded mi, an aggregated hash Hi is generated and loaded into
TPM PCR, where H0=H(m0), and Hi=H(Hi−1 || H(mi)). Upon receiving the measurements
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and TPM-signed hash value, the attester proves the authentication of measurements by
verifying the hash value, which helps determine the integrity level of the platform. Also,
it strives to maintain the measurement performance by caching the measurement results
unless the executable contents are altered. However, IMA has the following limitations.
First, IMA requires to verify the entire components of the attestee platform while the
attestee may only demand the verification of certain applications. Second, the integrity
status of a system is validated by testing each measurement entry independently, focusing
on the high integrity processes. However, it is impractical to disregard newly installed
untrusted applications or data from the untrusted network.
PRIMA [35] is an attestation work based on IMA and CW-Lite integrity model [57].
PRIMA attempts to improve the efficiency of attestation by only verifying codes, data, and
information flows related to trusted subjects. On one hand, PRIMA needs to be extended
to capture the dynamic nature of system states such as software and policy updates, which
could be an obstacle for maintaining its efficiency. On the other hand, PRIMA represents
an attestation result with binary decision (trust or distrust) and does not give semantic
information about how much the attestee platform can be trusted or untrusted.
Property-based attestation [23] is an effort to protect the privacy of a platform by
collectively mapping related system configurations to attestation properties. For example,
“SELinux-enabled” is a property which can be mapped to a system configuration indicating
that the system is protected with an SELinux policy. That is, this approach prevents the
configurations of a platform from being disclosed to a challenger. However, due to the
immense configurations of the hardware and software of the platform, mapping all system
configurations to properties is infeasible and impractical. Semantic remote attestation [32]
is proposed with a trusted virtual machine running on a platform. Through monitoring
the policy attached to a running software, its behavior is verified. But this approach does
not define the correct behavior of a security policy with respect to integrity, which leads
the attestation to be intractable. Behavior-based attestation [15] attempts to attest system
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behaviors based on an application level policy model. Such a model-based approach may
not comprehensively realize the complex behaviors of dynamic systems.
6.1.2 Integrity Models
As described in Chapter 2, there exist several different integrity models. However,
there is a gap between concrete measurements of a system’s components and verification
of its integrity status. We believe an application-oriented and domain-centric approach
accommodates the requirements of attestation evaluation better than advocating an
abstract-level models. For example, in a Linux system, a subject in one of traditional
integrity models can correspond to a set of processes, belonging to a single application
domain. For instance, an Apache domain may include various process types such as
httpd_t, http_sysadm_devpts_t, and httpd_ prewikka_script_t. All of these
types can have information flows among them, which should be regarded as a single
integrity level. Also, sensitive objects in a domain should share the same integrity
protection of its subjects. To comprehensively describe the system integrity requirements,
in this attestation work, we use the previous proposed domain-based isolation approach as
our system integrity requirements.
6.2 Design of DR@FT
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Figure 6.1: Overview of DR@FT
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DR@FT consists of three main parties: an attestee (the target platform), an attester
(attestation challenger), and a trusted authority, as shown in Figure 6.1. The attestee is
required to provide its system state information to the attester to be verified. Here, we
assume that an attestee initially is in a trusted system state. After certain system behaviors,
the system state is changed to a new state. An attestation reporting daemon on the attestee
gets the measured new state information (step 1) with IMA, and generates the policy
updates (step 2). This daemon then gets AIK-signed PCR value(s) and sends to the attester.
After the attester receives and authenticates the information, with the attestee’s AIK public
key certificate from the trusted authority, it verifies the attestee integrity through codes and
data verification (step 3), reporting process authentication (step 4) and policy analysis (step
5).
6.2.1 System State and Trust Requirement
For the attestation purpose, the system state is a snapshot of an attestee system at a
particular moment, where the factors characterizing the state can influence the system
integrity in any future moment of the system. Based on the domain-based isolation, the
attestee system integrity can be represented via information flows, which are characterized
by the trusted subject list, filters, policies, and the trustworthiness of TCBs. Based on these,
we define the system state of the attestee as follows.
Definition 6 : A system state at the time period i is a tuple Ti={ T SLi, CDi, Policyi, Filteri,
RProcessi }, where
• T SLi={s0, s1....sn} represents a trusted subject list containing a set of subjects s0,
s1....sn in TCBs and TCBd . The purpose of this trusted subject list is to specify
the high integrity processes or application processes that should be protected on this
platform.
• CDi={cd (s0), cd (s1)....cd (sn)} is a set of codes and data for loading a subject s j ∈
T SLi.
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• Policyi is the security policy currently configured on the attestee.
• Filteri is a set of processes that are defined to allow information flow from low
integrity processes to high integrity processes.
• RProcessi represents a list of processes that measure, monitor, and report the current
T SLi, CDi, Filteri and Policyi information. IMA agent and the attestation reporting
daemon are the examples of the RProcessi.
According to this definition, a system state does not include a particular application’s
running state such as its memory page and CPU context (stacks and registers). It only
represents the security configuration or policy of an attestee system. A system state
transition indicates one or more changes in T SLi, CDi, Policyi , Filteri, or RProcessi.
A system state Ti is trusted if
• T SLi belongs to TCBs and TCBd;
• CDi does not contain untrusted codes and data;
• Policyi satisfies domain-based isolation;
• Filteri belongs to the defined filter in domain-based isolation; and
• RProcessi codes and data do not contain malicious codes and data and these
RProcessi processes are integrity protected from the untrusted processes via Policyi.
As mentioned, we assume there exists an initial trusted system state T0 which satisfies.
Through changing the variables in T0, the system transits to states T1, T2 ... Ti. The
attestation purpose is to verify if any of these states is trusted.
6.2.2 Attestation Procedures
Attestee Measurements The measurement at the attestee side has two different forms,
depending on how much the attestee system changes. In case any subject in TCBs is
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updated, the attestee must be fully remeasured from the system reboot and the attester
needs to attest it completely, as this subject may affect the integrity of subjects in RProcess
of the system such as the measurement agent and reporting daemon. After the reboot and
all TCBs subjects are remeasured, a trusted initial system state T0 is built. To perform this
re-measurement, the attestee measures a state Ti and generates the measurement list Mi
containing each measurement.
• Trusted subject list (T SLi) measurement: With TPM and measurement mechanisms
such as IMA, trusted subject list T SLi is measured with a result mtsl , which is added
to a measurement list by Mi = Mi||mtsl . H (Mi) is extended to a particular PCR of
the TPM, where H is a hash function such as SHA1.
• Codes and data (CDi) measurement: For every subject s j in T SLi, its codes and
data cd(s j) are measured. To specify the mapping relationship, measurement mcds j
consists of the information of cd(s j) and s j. After mcds j is generated, it is added to
the measurement by Mi=Mi||mcds j and its hash value is extended to PCR.
• Policy (Policyi) measurement: Corresponding to Policyi, the attestee generates
the measurement mp, which is added to a measurement list with Mi=Mi||mp, and
corresponding PCR is extended with its hash value.
• Filter (Filteri) measurement: The codes and data of Filteri are measured as m f ,
which is extended to a measurement list Mi=Mi||m f , and the PCR is extended.
• Attestation Process (RProcessi) measurement: The codes and data of AProcessi are
measured as mr, which is added to a measurement list Mi=Mi||mr, and the PCR is
also extended.
In another case, where there is no TCBs subject updated and the T SLi or Filteri subjects
belonging to TCBd are updated, the attestee only needs to measure the updated codes and
data loading the changed TSL or filter subject, and generates a measurement list Mi. The
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generation of this measurement list is realized through the run-time measurement supported
by the underlying measurement agent.
To support both types of measurements, we develop an attestation reporting daemon
which monitors the run-time measurements of the attestee. In case the run-time
measurements for the TCBs are changed, the attestee is required to be rebooted and fully
measured with IMA. The measurements values are then sent to the attester by the daemon.
On the other side, the changed measurement value is measured by IMA and captured
with the reporting daemon only if the measurement for TCBd is changed. Obviously, this
daemon should be trusted and is included as part of TCBs. That is, its codes and data are
required to be protected with integrity policy and corresponding hash values are required
to be stored at the attester side.
Policy Updates To analyze if the current state of the attestee satisfies domain-based
integrity property, the attester requires information about the current security policy loaded
at the attestee side. Due to the large volume of policy rules in a security policy, sending
all policy rules in each attestation and verifying all of them by the attester may cause the
performance overhead. Hence, in DR@FT, the attestee only generates policy updates from
the latest attested trusted state and sends them to the attester for the attestation of such
updates.
To support this mechanism, we have the attestation reporting daemon monitor any
policy update on attestee system and generate a list of updated policy rules. The algorithm
of this operation is shown in Algorithm 1. With a function threadMonitor, upon the system
policy Policyi−1 is changed on state Ti−1, the daemon process reads the policy rules in the
stored security policy Policy0 of the trusted system state T0 and the current policy Policyi
separately, and compares these rules with a function compareResult. Then the daemon
finds the added, changed and deleted rules through functions added, changed, deleted
separately, and saves them into the policy update file. Note that the policy comparison
is performed between the current updated policy and the stored trusted security policy
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Policy0 or previously attested and trusted Policyi−1. The complexity of this policy update
algorithm is O(nr), where nr represents the number of the policy rules in the new policy
file Policyi.
Algorithm 1: Generating Policy Updates
Input: Currently configured policy file Pi, stored trusted policy file P0 , currently
running updates thread Us
Output: Policy updates file Pupdates
state := threadMonitor(Us,Pi)1
if isChanged(state) then2
f ileFlow := Initialize(Pupdates)3
Rlist := readPolicy(Pi)4
foreach ri ∈ Rlist do5
compareResult := (ri,P0)6
if compareResult == 1 then7
added( f ileFlow,ri)8
else9
if compareResult == 2 then10
changed( f ileFlow,P0,ri)11
markPolicy(P0,ri)12
else13
markPolicy(P0,ri)14
Rlist := readPolicy(P0)15
foreach ri ∈ Rlist do16
if isnotMarked(P0,ri) then17
deleted( f ileFlow,ri)18
Codes and Data Verification With received measurement list Mi and AIK-signed
PCRs, the attester first verifies the measurement integrity by re-constructing the hash
values and compares with PCR values. After this is passed, the attester performs the
analysis. Specifically, it obtains the hash values of CDi and checks if they corresponds to
known-good fingerprints. Also, the attester needs to assure that the T SLi belongs to TCBs
and TCBd . In addition, the attester also gets the hash value of Filteri and ensures that they
belong to the filter list defined on the attester side. In case this step successes, the attester
has the assurance that target processes on attestee side are proved without containing any
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untrusted code or data, and the attester can proceed to next steps. On the other side, if this
step fails, the attester sends a proper attestation result denoting this situation.
Authenticating Reporting Process To prove that the received measurements and updated
policy rules are from the attestee, the attester authenticates them by verifying that all
the measurements, updates and integrity measurement agent processes in the attestee are
integrity protected. That is, the RProcessi does not contain any untrusted codes or data
and its measurements correspond to PCRs in the attester. Also, there is no integrity
violated information flow to these processes from subjects of T SLi, according to the domain
isolation rules. Note that these components can also be updated, but after any update of
these components, the system should be fully re-measured and attested from boot time as
aforementioned, i.e., to re-build a trusted initial system state T0.
Policy Analysis by Attester DR@FT analyzes policy using a graph-based analysis
method [14, 66, 67]. In this method, a policy file is first visualized into a graph, then
this policy graph is analyzed against pre-defined security model such as our domain-based
isolation, and a policy violation graph is generated. The main goal of this approach is to
give semantic information of attestation result to the attestee, such that its system or security
administrator can quickly and intuitively obtain any violated integrity configuration.
Note that verifying all the security policy rules in each attestation request decrease the
efficiency, as loading policy graph and checking all the policy rules one by one cost a lot
of time. Thus, we need to develop an efficient way for analyzing the attestee policy. In our
method, the attester stores the policy of initial trusted system state T0 or the latest trusted
system state Ti, and its corresponding policy graph is loaded without any policy violation.
Upon receiving the updated information from the attestee, the attester just needs to analyze
these updates to see if there is new information flow violating integrity.
Algorithm 2 realizes this policy analysis method with a policy graph constructed
from a complete policy file [14]. First, a function policyParse parses the updated
policy information into subjects, objects, and their relationships with permission mapping.
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Second, we load this information onto the previously generated Policy0 graph with
functions changeNodes and changeLinks, respectively. Then it determines if there is new
information flow generated on this graph with a function getnewFlow. Third, we need
to check if this new information flow violates our domain-based isolation rules using a
function identifyViolation. Through this algorithm, rather than analyzing all the policy
rules and all information flows for each attestation, we verify the new policy through
only checking the updated policy rules and the newly identified information flow. The
complexity of this policy analysis algorithm is O(nn +nl +nt), where nn represents the
number of changed subjects and objects, nl is the number of changed subjects and objects
relationship in the policy update file; and nt represents the number of changed TCB in the
TSL file.
Algorithm 2: Finding Integrity Violations with Policy Graph and Updates
Input: Initial trusted policy graph G0, policy updating file Pu, TSL file Tlisti, policy
explanation file Fe, permission mapping File Fp, subject classification file Fs,
object classification file Fo
Output: Policy violation graph G f low
Policyu := policyParse(Pu,Fe ,Fp,Fs,Fo)1
Nlist := getU pdateSO(Policyu)2
foreach ri ∈ Rlist do3
changeNodes(na,G0)4
Llist := getU pdateLink(Policyu)5
foreach la ∈ Llist do6
changeLinks(la,G0)7
getnewFlow(la,G0)8
foreach ta ∈ Tlist do9
changeTCB(ta,G0)10
G f low := identi f yViolation(ta,G0)11
Attestation Result Sending to Attester In case the attestation is successful, a new
trusted system state is developed and the corresponding information is stored at the attester
side for subsequent attestations. On the other hand, if the attestation fails, there are
several possible attestation results including CDi Integrity Fail, CDi Integrity Success,
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RProcessi Unauthenticated, and Policyi Fail/Success, and CDi Integrity Success, RProcessi
Authenticated, and Policyi Fail /Success. To assist the attestee reconfiguration, the attester
also sends a representation of the policy violation graph to the attestee. Moreover, with this
policy violation graph, the attester specifies the violation ranking and the trustworthiness
of the attestee, which is explained in next section.
6.3 Integrity Violation Analysis
As we discussed above, existing attestation solutions such as TCG and IMA lack the
expressiveness of the attestation result. In addition to their boolean-based response for
attestation result, DR@FT adopts a graph-based policy analysis mechanism, where a policy
violation graph can be constructed for identifying all policy violations on the attestee side.
We further introduce a risk model built on a ranking scheme, which gives the implication
of how severe the discovered policy violations are, and how to efficiently resolve them.
Figure 6.2: Example policy violation graph and rank
6.3.1 Policy Violation Graph
Information flow represents how data flows among system subjects, both trusted and
untrusted. A sequence of information flow transitions between two subjects shows an
information flow path. Applying our domain-based isolation approach, policy violations
can be detected to identify information flows from low integrity subjects to high integrity
subjects. Corresponding information flow paths representing such policy violations are
named violated information flow paths (simply violation paths).
Obviously, we can find out two kinds of violation paths, direct violation paths and
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indirect violation paths. A direct violation path is a one-hop path through which an
information flow can go from a low integrity subject to a high integrity subject. We observe
that information flows are transitive in general. Therefore, there may exist information
flows from a low integrity subject to a high integrity subject via several other subjects.
This multi-hop path is called indirect violation path. All direct and indirect violation paths
belonging to a domain can construct a policy violation graph for this domain.
Definition 7 : A policy violation graph for a domain d is a directed graph Gv = (V v,Ev)
where
• V v ⊆ V vNTCB ∪V vTCBd ∪V vTCB where V vNTCB, V vTCBd and V vTCB are subject vertices
containing in direct or indirect violation paths of domain d and belong to NON-TCB,
TCBd , and TCBs, respectively.
• Ev ⊆ EvNd ∪ EvdT ∪ EvNT ∪ EvNTCB ∪ EvTCBd ∪ EvTCB where EvNd ⊆ (V vNTCB ×V vTCBd),
EvdT ⊆ (V vTCBd×V vTCB), EvNT ⊆ (V vNTCB×V vTCB), EvNTCB ⊆ (V vNTCB×V vNTCB), EvTCBd ⊆
(V vTCBd ×V vTCBd), and EvTCB ⊆ (V vTCB×V vTCB), and all edges in Ev are contained in
direct or indirect violation paths of domain d.
Figure 6.2 (a) shows an example of policy violation graph which examines information
flows between NON-TCB and TCBd1. Five direct violation paths are identified in this
graph: <S′1, S1>, <S
′
2, S2>, <S
′
3, S2>, <S
′
4, S4>, and <S
′
5, S4>, crossing all the boundaries
between NON-TCB and TCBd . Also, eight indirect violation paths exist. For example,
<S′2, S5> is a four-hop violation path passing through other three TCBd subjects S2, S3, and
S4.
6.3.2 Ranking Policy Violation Graph
In order to explore more features of policy violation graphs and facilitate efficient policy
violation detection and resolution, we introduce a scheme for ranking policy violation
1Similarly, the information flows between NON-TCB and TCBs, and between TCBd and TCBs can be
examined accordingly.
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graphs. There are two steps to rank a policy violation graph. First, TCBd subjects in
the policy violation graph are ranked based on dependency relationships among them. The
rank of a TCBd subject shows reachable probability of low integrity information flows from
NON-TCB subjects to the TCBd subject. In addition, direct violation paths in the policy
violation graph are evaluated based on the ranks of TCBd subjects to indicate severity of
these paths which allow low integrity information to reach TCBd subjects. The ranked
policy violation graphs are valuable for a system administrator as they need to estimate the
risk level of a system and provide a guide for choosing appropriate strategies for resolving
policy violations efficiently.
6.3.2.1 Ranking Subjects in TCBd
Our notation of SubjectRank (SR) in policy violation graphs is a criterion that indicates
the likelihood of low integrity information flows coming to a TCBd subject from NON-TCB
subjects through direct or indirect violation paths. The ranking scheme we introduce in
this section adopts a similar process of rank analysis applied in hyper-text link analysis
system, such as Google’s PageRank [22] that utilizes a link structure provided by hyper
links between web pages to gauge their importance. Comparing with PageRank which
focuses on analyzing a web graph where the entries are any web pages contained in the
web graph, the entries of low integrity information flows to TCBd subjects in a policy
violation graph are only identified NON-TCB subjects.
Consider a policy violation graph with N NON-TCB subjects, and si is a TCBd subject.
Let N(si) be the number of NON-TCB subjects from which low integrity information
flows could come to si, N
′
(si) the number of NON-TCB subjects from which low integrity
information flows could directly reach to si, In(si) a set of TCBd subjects pointing to si,
and Out(s j) a set of TCBd subjects pointed from s j. The probability of low integrity
information flows reaching a subject si is given by:
SR(si) =
N(si)
N
(
N
′
(si)
N(si)
+(1− N
′
(si)
N(si)
) ∑
s j∈In(si)
SR(s j)
|Out(s j)| ) (6.1)
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SubjectRank can be interpreted as a Markov Process, where the states are TCBd
subjects, and the transitions are the links between TCBd subjects which are all evenly
probable. While a low integrity information flow attempts to reach a high integrity subject,
it should select an entrance (a NON-TCB subject) which has the path(s) to this subject.
Thus, the possibility of selecting correct entries to a target subject is N(si)N . After selecting
correct entries, there still exist two ways, through direct violation paths or indirect violation
paths, to reach a target subject. Therefore, the probability of flow transition from a subject
is divided into two parts: N
′
(si)
N(si)
for direct violation paths and 1− N
′
(si)
N(si)
for indirect violation
paths. The 1− N
′
(si)
N(si)
mass is divided equally among the subject’s successors s j, and
SR(s j)
|Out(s j)|
is the rank value derived from s j.
Figure 6.2 (b) displays a result of applying Equation (1) to the policy violation graph
showing in Figure 6.2 (a). Note that even though subject s4 has two direct paths from
NON-TCB subjects like subject s2, the rank value of s4 is higher than the rank value of s2,
because there is another indirect flow path to s4 (via s3).
6.3.2.2 Ranking Direct Violation Path
We further define PathRank (PR) as the rank of a direct violation path2, which
is a criterion reflecting the severity of the violation path through which low integrity
information flows may come to TCBd subjects. Direct violation paths are regarded as
the entries of low integrity data to TCBd in policy violation graph. Therefore, the ranks
of direct violation paths give a guide for system administrator to adopt suitable defense
countermeasures for solving identified violations.
To calculate PathRank accurately, three conditions are needed to be taken into account:
(1) the number of TCBd that low integrity flows can reach through this direct violation
path; (2) SubjectRank of reached TCBd subjects; and (3) the number of hops to reach a
TCBd subject via this direct violation path.
2It is possible that a system administrator may also want to evaluate indirect violation paths for violation
resolution. In that case, our ranking scheme could be adopted to rank indirect violation paths as well.
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Suppose < s
′
i,s j > is a direct violation path from a NON-TCB subject s
′
i to a TCBd
subject s j in a policy violation graph. Let Reach(< s
′
i,s j >) be a function returning a set of
TCBd subjects to which low integrity information flows may go through a direct violation
path < s
′
i,s j >, SR(sl) the rank of a TCBd subject sl , and Hs(s
′
i,sl) a function returning the
hops of the shortest path from a NON-TCB subject s
′
i to a TCBd subject sl . The following
equation is utilized to compute a rank value of the direct violation path < s
′
i,s j >.
PR(< s
′
i ,s j >) = ∑
sl∈Reach(<s′i ,s j>)
SR(sl)
Hs(s
′
i ,sl)
(6.2)
Figure 6.2 (c) shows the result using the above-defined equation to calculate the
PathRank of the example policy violation graph. For example, < s
′
2,s2 > has a higher
rank than < s
′
1,s1 >, because < s
′
2,s2 > may result in low integrity information flows to
reach more or important TCBd subjects than < s
′
1,s1 >.
6.3.2.3 Usage of Ranked Policy Violation Graph
We achieve the following benefits with our ranked policy violation graph for security
analysis.
• Policy violation resolution: A system administrator is able to adopt different
countermeasures to resolve identified violations with respect to the different rank
values of violation paths. For example, a system administrator may apply a
strong defense countermeasure, such as adding more strict filters, even disabling
an information flow, to resolve a highly ranked violation path. On the other hand, it
would be better for a system administrator to first eliminate highly ranked violation
paths, because higher ranked violation paths, in general, involve in more policy
violations and threat more TCBd subjects.
• Security measurement: The total rank of all violation paths provides a measurement
of risk level of a system. Regarding attestation process, even though an attestation
may be failed, such rank value could reflect the trustworthiness of attested system
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accurately.
• Assistance in visual policy analysis: An entire policy violation graph may be in
a huge size and very complicated. Thus, it is hard for system administrators to
understand and analyze the whole piece of a policy violation graph. Ranks aid in
selectively showing certain important parts of a policy violation graph based on the
priority. Therefore, a system administrator could only concentrate on portions of a
policy violation graph containing highly ranked information flow paths, which make
the analysis and resolution of policy violation more effective.
6.3.3 Evaluating Trustworthiness
Let Pd be a set of all direct violation paths in a policy violation graph. The entire rank,
which can be considered as a risk level of the system, can be computed as follows:
RiskLevel = ∑
<s′i ,s j>∈Pd
PR(< s
′
i ,s j >) (6.3)
The calculated risk level could reflect the trustworthiness of an attestee. Generally,
the lower risk level indicates the higher trustworthiness of a system. When an attestation
is successful and there is no violation path being identified, the risk level of the attested
system is zero, which means an attestee has the highest trustworthiness. On the other
hand, when an attestation is failed, corresponding risk level of a target system is computed.
A selective service could be achieved based on this fine-grained attestation result. That
is, the number of services provided by a service provider to the target system may be
decided with respect to the trust level of the target system. On the other hand, a system
administrator could refer to this attestation result as the evaluation of his system as well
as security guidelines since this quantity response would give her a proper justification to
select security countermeasures for improving the trustworthiness of a system.
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6.3.4 Attestee Reconfiguration
When the current state of an attestee does not satisfy integrity requirements, a system
administrator needs to change system configuration based on the attestation result to
enhance a system’s integrity and improve its trust level. There are two ways to reconfigure
a system:
• Changing CDi and T SLi: In case an attestation is failed because of loading malicious
or unknown codes or data into the system, removing such root causes can change the
system state to be attested successfully.
• Changing Policyi: Based on the violated information flow paths and corresponding
ranks, a system administrator needs to first eliminate highly ranked violation
paths since they generally involve more violations and more TCBd subjects.
Through modifying policy rules, P f lowi is changed to satisfy our domain isolation
requirement. In other words, an attestee can maintain integrity requirements by
modifying system policies properly for a newly installed software which interacts
with T SL subjects.
6.4 Implementation and Evaluation
We have implemented DR@FT to evaluate its effectiveness and performance. This
section first describes our experimentation setup, followed by implementation details and
effectiveness evaluation, and performance study.
6.4.1 Attestee Configuration
Our attestee platform is a Lenovo ThinkPad X61 with Intel Core 2Duo Processor L7500
1.6GHz, 2 GB RAM, and Atmel TPM, and Fedora Core 6 is installed. We enable SELinux
with the default policy based on the current distribution of SELinux [42]. To measure the
attestee system with TPM, we update the Linux kernel to 2.6.26.rc8 with the latest IMA
implementation [1], where SELinux hooks and IMA functions are enabled.
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....
10 033e4f559247b256b5a163568275d7901ebe3734  GBK.so
10 041789c808648eac2d7a20c5105f7996f55a6c56  GEORGIAN-PS.so
10 4d019ac9fd103d42f2f7f7d081becc3dd5beb806  IBM850.so
10 73b86a44681c8d778bb143bdd233a6477dc19884  IBM852.so
10 9348eeafbbe7fe8627330b543c3f88d028c7e16f  ECMA-CYRILLIC.so
....
10 38f30a0a967fcf2bfeele3b2971de540115048c8  initrc
....
(a) Measurement example (b) Measurement after installing rootkit
....
10 033e4f559247b256b5a163568275d7901ebe3734  GBK.so
10 041789c808648eac2d7a20c5105f7996f55a6c56  GEORGIAN-PS.so
10 4d019ac9fd103d42f2f7f7d081becc3dd5beb806  IBM850.so
10 73b86a44681c8d778bb143bdd233a6477dc19884  IBM852.so
10 9348eeafbbe7fe8627330b543c3f88d028c7e16f  ECMA-CYRILLIC.so
....
10 d63d12ced978aca120bfe6ee7683e394c2ffaef0  initrc
....
Figure 6.3: Example of the DR@FT measurement list
Having IMA enabled, we configure the measurement of the attestee information.
Specifically, after the attestee system kernel is booted, we mount the sysfs file
system and inspect the measurement list values in ascii_runtime_measurements and
ascii_bios_measur
ements. Figure 6.3(a) shows a sample of the measurement list. The fields include the PCR
which is extended with the hash, the hash of the file, and the file name.
6.4.2 Attestation Implementation
We start from a legitimate attestee and make measurements of the attestee system for
the later verification. To invoke a new attestation request from the attester, the attestation
reporting daemon runs in the attestee and monitors the attestee system. This daemon
is composed of two main threads. One is to monitor and get the new system state
measurements and the other is to monitor and obtain the policy updates of the attestee.
In case the attestee system state is updated due to new software installation, changing
policy, and so on. An appropriate thread of the daemon automatically obtains the new
measurement values as discussed in 6.2. The daemon then securely transfers the attestation
information to the attester based on the security mechanisms supported by the trusted
authority.
After receiving the updated system information from the attestee, the measurement
module of the attester checks the received measurements against the stored PCR to
prove its integrity. To analyze the possible revised attestee policy, the policy analysis
module is developed as a daemon, which is ported from a policy analysis engine. We
extend the engine to identify violated information flows from the updated policy rules
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based on domain-based isolation rules. We also accommodate the algorithm presented
in Section 6.2.2, as well as our rank scheme to evaluate the trustworthiness of the attestee.
6.4.3 Evaluation
To assess the proposed attestation framework, we attest our testbed platform with
Apache web server installed. To configure the trusted subject list of the Apache domain, we
first identify the TCBs based on the reference monitor-based TCB identification, including
the integrity measurement, monitoring agents, and daemon. For TCBd of the Apache, we
first identify the Apache information domain subjects and objects with keyword http in the
policy. Subjects such as httpd_t, httpd_ssh_t, and objects such as httpd_cache_t are
regarded as Apache domain subjects and objects. We then identify the subjects and objects
that can flow to these subjects and objects. Within the identified information domain, we
discover Apache TCBd such as httpd_t and httpd_suexec_t through the domain-based
isolation principles. In addition, for Apache domain, we identify the initial filters including
sshd_t, passwd_t, su_t. After this, we install the unverified codes and data to evaluate
the effectiveness of our attestation framework. The detail process can be seen in Chapter 3
for how to identify the information of apache and TCB(d) of Apache.
Installing Malicious Code We first install a Linux rootkit, which is designed to
compromise critical system processes and leave Trojan horse into it. Here, we assign
the rootkit with the domain unconfined_t that enables information flows to domain
initrc_t labeling initrc process, which belongs to TCBs of the attestee.
Following the framework proposed in Section 6.2, the attestee system is measured
from the bootstrap with IMA. After getting the new measurement values, the reporting
daemon sends these measurements to the attester. Note that there is no policy update in
this experiment. After getting the measurements from the attestee, attester verifies them by
trying to match the measured hash values. Figure 6.3 shows the initial measurements of
the initrc (in a trusted initial system state) and the changed value because of the installed
rootkit. The difference between these two measurements indicates the original initrc is
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altered, and the attester confirms that the attestee is not in a trusted state.
Table 6.1: Mplayer policy information
Mplayer Subjects
staff_mencoder_t staff_mplayer_t
user_mplayer_t sysadm_mencoder_t
sysadm_mplayer_t user_mencoder_t
Mplayer Objects
mencoder_exec_t mplayer_etc_t
mplayer_exec_t staff_mplayer_client_xevent_t
staff_mplayer_xproperty_t staff_mplayer_property_xevent_t
staff_mplayer_default_xevent_t staff_mplayer_focus_xevent_t
staff_mplayer_home_t staff_mplayer_input_xevent_t
staff_mplayer_tmpfs_t staff_mplayer_manage_xevent_t
user_mplayer_default_xevent_t user_mplayer_focus_xevent_t
user_mplayer_home_t user_mplayer_input_xevent_t
user_mplayer_xproperty_t user_mplayer_client_xevent_t
user_mplayer_manage_xevent_t user_mplayer_property_xevent_t
sysadm_mplayer_default_xevent_t sysadm_mplayer_focus_xevent_t
user_mplayer_tmpfs_t sysadm_mplayer_client_xevent_t
sysadm_mplayer_home_t sysadm_mplayer_input_xevent_t
sysadm_mplayer_manage_xevent_t sysadm_mplayer_property_xevent_t
sysadm_mplayer_xproperty_t sysadm_mplayer_tmpfs_t
Installing Vulnerable Software In this experimentation, we install a vulnerable software
called Mplayer on the attestee side. Mplayer is a media player and encoder software
which is susceptible to several integer overflows in the real video stream dumuxing code.
These flaws allow an attacker to cause a denial of service or potentially execution of the
arbitrary code by supplying a deliberately crafted video file. After a Mplayer is installed,
a Mplayer policy module is also loaded into the attestee policy. In this policy module,
there are several different subjects such as staff_mplayer_t, sysadm_mplayer_t, and
so on. Also, some objects are defined in security policies such as user_mplayer_home_t
and staff_mplayer_home_t. A complete list of these subjects and objects is shown in
Table 6.1.
After the Mplayer is installed, the attestation daemon finds that the new measurement
of Mplayer is generated and the security policy of the system is changed. As the Mplayer
does not belong to TCBs and Apache TCBd , the attestation daemon does not need to send
the measurements to the attester. Consequently, the daemon only computes the security
policy updates and sends the information to the attester.
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staff_mencoder_t
user_mencoder_t
sysadm_mencoder_t
sysadm_mplayer_t
user_mplayer_t
staff_mplayer_t
httpd_t
httpd_suexec_t
httpd_prewikka_script_thttpd_awstats_script_t
httpd_rotatelogs_t
ncsd_var_run_t
sysadm_devpts_t
cifs_t
0.1713
0.1713 0.12963
0.12963
0.5269
0.3889
0.3426
0.26345
0.26345
0.3426
0.3889
0.3333
0.0556
0.1713
0.12963
Figure 6.4: Information flow verification of Mplayer
Table 6.2: Attestation performance analysis (in seconds)
Policy Change Dynamic Static
Size TPupdate Tsend TPanalysis Overhead TPsend TPanalysis Overhead
0 0.23 0 0 0.23 14.76 90.13 104.89
-0.002MB (Reduction) 0.12 0.002 0.02 0.14 14.76 90.11 104.87
-0.019MB (Reduction) 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.12 14.74 89.97 104.34
-0.024MB (Reduction) 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.09 14.74 89.89 104.23
0.012MB (Addition) 0.37 0.01 0.03 0.41 14.77 90.19 104.96
0.026MB (Addition) 0.58 0.02 0.03 0.63 14.78 90.33 105.11
0.038MB (Addition) 0.67 0.03 0.04 0.74 14.79 90.46 105.25
Upon receiving the updated policies, we analyze these updates and obtain a policy
violation graph as shown in Figure 6.4, where the filled circle nodes representing subjects
and objects related to Mplayer; unfilled circle nodes representing subjects and objects
related to Apache; and unfilled rectangle nodes representing other objects. The links
show the information flow from Mplayer to Apache. The rank values on the paths
indicate the severity of the corresponding violation paths.Through objects such as cifs_t,
sysadm_devtps_t, ncsd_var_run_t, information flows from Mplayer can reach
Apache domain. In addition, rank values are calculated and shown in the policy violation
graph, which guides effective violation resolutions. For example, there are three higher
ranked paths including path from sysadm_devpts_t to httpd_t, from ncsd_var_run_t
to httpd_rotatelogs_t, and from cifs_t to httpd_prewikka_script_t. Meanwhile,
a risk level value (1.2584) reflecting the trustworthiness of the attestee system is computed
based on the ranked policy violation graph.
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Once receiving the attestation result shown in Figure 6.4, the attestee administrator
solves the violation that has the higher rank than others. Thus, the administrator can first
resolve the violation related to httpd_t through introducing httpd_sysadm_devpts_t.
allow httpd_t httpd_sysadm_devtps_t:chr_file {ioctl read write
getattr lock append};
After the policy violation resolution, the risk level of the attestee system is lowered
to 0.7315 . Continuously, after the attestee resolves all the identified policy violations
and the risk level is decreased to be zero, the attestation daemon gets a new policy update
file and sends it to the attester. Upon receiving this file, the attester verifies whether these
information flows violate domain-based isolation integrity rules since these flows are within
the NON-TCB–even though there are new information flow compared to the stored Policy0.
Thus, an attestation result is generated which specifies the risk level (in this case, zero) of
the current attestee system. Consequently, a new trusted system state is built for the attestee.
In addition, the information of this new trusted system state is stored in the attester side for
the later attestation.
6.4.4 Performance
To examine the scalability and efficiency of DR@FT, we investigate how well the
attestee measurement agent, attestation daemon, and the attester policy analysis module
scale along with the increased complexity, and how efficiently DR@FT performs by
comparing it with the traditional approaches.
In DR@FT, the important situations influencing the attestation performance include
system updates and policy changes. Hence, we evaluate the performance of DR@FT
by changing codes and data to be measured and modifying the security policies. Based
on our study, we observe that normal policy increased or decreased no more than 40KB
when installing or uninstalling software. Also, a system administrator does not make the
enormous changes over the policy. Therefore the performance is measured with the range
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from zero to around 40KB in terms of policy size.
Performance on the attestee side Based on DR@FT, the attestee has three main factors
influencing the attestation performance. (1) Time spent for the measurement: Based on our
experimentation, the measurement time increases roughly linearly with the size of the target
files. For example, measuring policy files with 17.2MB and 20.3MB requires 14.63 seconds
and 18.26 seconds, respectively. Measuring codes around 27MB requires 25.3sec. (2) Time
spent for identifying policy updates TPupdate: Based on the specification in Section 6.2,
policy updates are required to be identified and sent to the attester. As shown in Table 6.2,
for a system policy which is the size of 17.2MB at its precedent state, the increase of the
policy size requires more time for updating the policy and vice versa. (3) Time spent for
sending policy updates TPsend: Basically, the more policy updates, the higher overhead was
observed.
Performance on the attester side In DR@FT, the measurement verification is relatively
straightforward. At the attester side the time spent for policy analysis TPanalysis mainly
influences its performance. As shown in Table 6.2, the analysis time roughly increases
when the policy change rate increases.
Comparison of dynamic and static attestation To further specify the efficiency of
DR@FT, we compare the overhead of DR@FT with a static attestation. In the static
approach, the attestee sends all system state information to an attester, and the attester
verifies the entire information step by step. As shown in Table 6.2, the time spent for
static attestation is composed of TPsend and TPanalysis, which represent the time for sending
policy module and analyzing them, respectively. Obviously, the dynamic approach can
dramatically reduce the overhead compared to the static approach. It shows that DR@FT
is an efficient way when policies on an attestee are updated frequently.
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6.5 Conclusion
Through extending visualization-based policy analysis and management approach, w
have presented a dynamic remote attestation framework called DR@FT for efficiently
verifying if a system satisfies integrity protection property and indicates integrity violations
which determine its trustworthiness level. The integrity property of our work is based
on an DIM, which is utilized to describe the integrity requirements and identify integrity
violations of a system. To achieve the efficiency and effectiveness of remote attestation,
DR@FT focuses on system changes on the attestee side. We have extended a powerful
policy analysis engine to represent integrity violations with the rank scheme. In addition,
our results showed that our dynamic approach can dramatically reduce the overhead
compared to static approach. We believe such an intuitive evaluation method would
help system administrators reconfigure the system with more efficient and strategic
manner. DR@FT provides a fine-grained remote attestation not only for TCBs but also
for user-space domains. For our future work, we would further investigate how our
attestation framework can be applied to open network environments dealing with a trusted
and delegated attestation service for the attester. We also plan to optimize DR@FT and
release it to open source community.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUDING REMARKS
7.1 Summary
To analyze and manage the security policy, a fundamental question is to understand
the security requirements of the security policy in an open and distributed environment.
Instead of focusing on analyzing the security requirements for a specific policy, in general,
a trusted computing base is required to be protected in every system. From this aspect,
we need to analyze the requirements for protecting the trusted computing base followed by
the requirements of protecting other system components. Another important issue is how
to provide a usable security policy analysis and management approach to the stakeholders.
The usability includes how to present the security policy in an understandable way, how to
provide an easy and understandable policy analysis method, and how to provide an efficient
way for identifying policy violations such as how to conveniently identify the root causes
for the policy violations.
To tackle the above mentioned issues, we proposed a domain-based isolation model
to specify how to protect the system trusted computing base and how to protect other
system applications by realizing application isolations. Based on this model, several
rules were proposed to identify the policy violations. This model was first proved
based on a CPN simulation tool by analyzing the SELinux example policies. Also, we
proposed the semantic substrates-based and adjacency matrix-based visualization methods
to visualize the security policies for addressing usability issues. To provide an easy way
for the policy analysis, we developed a graphical query mechanisms for querying the
security policy and identifying policy violations. Still using semantic substrates-based
and adjacency matrix-based method to represent the policy violations, the critical points
and violation path are marked out with different color, shape and route to specify the
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origin of the policy violations. In addition, we implemented a tool called PVM based
on our visualization-based policy analysis and management framework. To measure the
effectiveness and efficiency of our tool, we also successfully performed the user study that
produced the favorable results. Finally, we extended our policy analysis and management
framework to support remote attestation for proving the trustworthiness of the system in an
open and distributed environment.
In addition to the above contributions, we strongly believe this work has several
potential impacts to the information security community. As an information flow-based
security model, DIM has significantly demonstrated the applicability of information flow
analysis in open and distributed environments. The method of using CPN also provides
the possibility of using such a system modeling tool for proving other security models
such as RBAC. Also, our information visualization methods bring the first-hand practical
experience for analyzing different security policies–such as policies for firewall policies
and other security appliance–with visual analytics. By sharing our experience with the
information security community, we hope to further improve a method for evaluating the
usability of technologies in information security.
7.2 Future Work
This ground-breaking work also has several future research directions:
7.2.1 Issues in Security Requirements
In our proposed approach, a domain-based isolation method was proposed, in which the
system TCB and TCB(d) are identified through specific strategies. This layouts high-level
requirements of the security policy. However, in case that the security policy is not that
well organized, it is very hard to identify such items to be protected. In addition, the filter
is normally based on a certain information flow. One process can work as a filter in one
situation but cannot work as a filter in the other situation. Hence, the filter identification
should be based on the policy violations as we proposed in our work. This would be a big
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challenge for the security policy architect. In the future, we would further investigate the
security model to handle this dilemma.
7.2.2 Security Policy Analysis and Management for Mobile Device
A possible application domain of our work would be security policy analysis and
management on mobile devices. However, due to the different security models such as
delegation models are applied into the mobile device policy, a more comprehensive security
policy analysis model is needed.
In addition, the performance of policy analysis is a big challenge since mobile devices
require a more efficient policy analysis tool. Also, for mobile devices, an owner would
be the policy architect, thus the policy specification and policy violation should be
convenient and easy for them to figure out. Due to these specific requirements, it is
tremendously necessary to extend and improve our proposed policy visualization methods
and a corresponding tool in both design and performance aspects. Furthermore, our
dynamic attestation work still has many unsolved issues to accommodate those issues on
mobile devices [48, 29, 72].
7.2.3 Security Policy Management
We will also continuously discover novel ways in effectively generating and managing
security policy for computing systems including operating systems and mobile devices as
well as new emerging infrastructures such as smart grid [45] and cloud computing [38,
71]. Especially identifying the security requirements related to access control for these
new infrastructures and developing new security policy framework would advance the
field of information technology security and help establish more trustworthy computing
environments for organizational users to safeguard sensitive and critical information.
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